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FOREWORD 
Bargaining power has long been a popular subject among farmers and farm 
organizations. Its popularity undoubtedly reflects farmers 1 continuing concern 
with their economic position relative to other sectors of the economy. Bargain-
ing power is accepted as an important policy objective by major farm organiza-
tions who otherwise agree on few farm program proposals. 
To explore bargaining power more fully, a series of staff seminars was 
sponsored by the Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment during the spring 
of 19 61. Papers presented at the seminars are contained in this publication. 
The papers develop four aspects of bargaining power. The first papers deal 
with the nature of bargaining power 1 its attainability as an agricultural policy 
objective 1 and the possibilities, limitations and consequences of increasing 
farmers 1 bargaining power. 
The challenge to education and the political implications of bargaining 
power proposals then are examined. Next, the experience of labor and industry 
plus the possibilities of existing agricultural producer groups to gain bargaining 
power are studied. 
Finally 1 the basic concept of resource allocation is examined. This paper 
was presented first during the series of seminars. It is included at the end of 
this publication in recognition of the theoretical nature of the subject and the 
difficulty non-economists may have in understanding it. 
Through this publication the papers are being made available to farmers, 
farm leaders and others who may be unused to the technical terminology of 
economics. An attempt has been made to preserve the technical precision used 
by economists in expressing themselves I yet to help the interested non-economist 
broaden his understanding of the nature and possibilities of farm bargaining power. 
To accomplish this latter objective I papers have been somewhat revised since the 
seminars and definitions of some economic terms have been included. The efforts 
of Edwin 0. Haroldsen I Editor 1 Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment 1 
have been particularly valuable in preparing these papers for a wider audience. 
It is recognized that these papers constitute only a beginning in the challenge 
of examining farm bargaining power. There is need for additional education and 
research in this area, where the issues have not been well defined nor the actions 
proposed to attain the goal adequately appraised. 
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CONCEPT AND IMPORTANCE OF BARGAINING POWER 
by L. B. Fletcher1 
Historically 1 farmers have maintained that they occupy an unequal and 
passive status in the market relative to firms in other sectors from .which they buy 
and sell. Currently they see themselves with no bargaining power and in a squeeze 
between rising costs of purchased inputs and decreasing prices of products they 
sell. There is wide agreement among farm groups about the desirability of increas-
ing farmers • bargaining power. This paper will consider (l) the meaning of bar-
gaining power, and (2) methods and consequences of manipulating bargaining 
power, and (3) the relevance of greater bargaining power for farmers as an agri-
cultural policy objective. 
That all buyers and sellers in either product or resource markets do not meet 
on completely equal terms is recognized in the earliest economic literature. 
Adam Smith, for example, observed in 1776, 11 In the long run the workman may be 
as necessary to his master as his master is to him, but the necessity is not so 
immediate ... Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant 
and uniform combination not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. n2 
Marshall also found inequality of bargaining strength between employers and 
workers and concluded that the workers • disadvantage lowers their wages. Simi-
larly 1 he thought I 11 Those sellers of commodities who are poor and numerous 
relatively to the purchasers are at a disadvantage in bargaining in the same way 
as are the sellers of labour . ., 3 
The Meaning of Bargaining Power 
Discussions of inequalities of bargaining power between the two parties of 
an exchange transaction have rarely attempted to explain the meaning of the term 
.,bargaining power . ., Apparently it has often been assumed that everyone knows 
from personal experience in shopping or selling what it means to possess a distinct 
advantage or disadvantage. When definitions have been attempted, wide variation 
in usage has made it difficult to attach a precise meaning to the term; economic 
literature reveals a serious lack of agreement as to its definition and importance. 
While any internally consistent definition cannot be regarded as incorrect,· a wide 
diversity of usage encourages misunderstanding of the concept and weakens 
attempts to deal explicitly and systematically with it. 
h critique of alternative definitions of bargaining power. Marshall attributes 
the inequality in bargaining strength between the employer and the worker to a 
wide variety of factors, including inadequate training 1 immobility 1 perishability, 
1 Assistant Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. 
2Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. (Everyman's ed.; London 1 1933), Book I, 
p. 59. 
3A1fred Marshall, Principles of Economics, (8th ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co.), 
p. 569. 
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and lack of reserve fund. 4 Thus, Marshall views bargaining power--defined 
only implicitly--as a general concept which includes all forces determining 
the wage rate. 
More recently, bargaining power was defined as the ability to obtain the 
most favorable price possible under conditions prevailing in all markets, 
either directly or indirectly involved. In other words the competitive situation 
in the market in which the transaction takes place and all restraints and reper-
cussions each party must face in all related markets enter as determinants of 
bargaining power. 5 The competitive price is the point of reference, and bar-
gaining power is proportional to the deviation of the price obtained from the 
price that would rule for the quantity supplied under pure competition in all 
relevant markets. 
Both of these definitions acc·ept all the determinants of price as determi-
nants of bargaining power. One emphasizes the factors which determine bar-
gaining power; the other emphasizes the gain resulting from possession of 
bargaining power relative to a situation in which it is absent. The important 
feature is that both definitions use bargaining power to express a conclusion 
about the totality of market forces. Expressed in terms of ultimate market 
outcomes, the concept appears logical and unambiguous. However, the diffi-
culty with making bargaining power equal to the whole of forces determining 
prices is relatively clear. "If we try to specify those factors which determine 
bargaining power, we find that we are merely enumerating and describing all 
the structural elements of the market, n6 
Others have attempted to name bargaining power as one factor among a 
number in price (or wage) determination. For example, one writer thought it 
influenced price determination through enhancement of one party• s "power to 
withhold ... 7 Another held that it is more important to ask which of the parties 
would suffer a greater loss from such withholding. Consequently he defined 
bargaining power as the ability to impose loss on the other party. 8 Similarly, 
the term may be defined as the power to organize and carry out a coercive 
device, skill in negotiation, monopoly power, supply control, or, as it is 
often used, an unspecified "other" factor in price determination. 
4Ibid. I pp. 560-569. 
5J. T. Dunlop and B. Higgins, "Bargaining Power and Market Structures," 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. L (19 42} , pp. 4-5. 
6J. W. McKie, Tin Can and Tin Plate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1959) 1 Po 24. 
7J. R. Commons and J. B. Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (4th ed.; 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936), p. 372. 
8s. H. Slichter, "Impact of Social Security Legislation upon Mobility and 
Enterprise," American Economic Review, Vol. XXX (1940), p. 57. See also 
G. W. Ladd and J. R. Strain, "What About Bargaining Power for Farmers?" 
Iowa Farm Science, Vol. 16, No.1 (July 1961), pp. 3-5. However, when 
these authors specify the conditions under which one party can impose a 
loss on another party, their determinants are merely a classification of all 
the forces which influence price. 
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Bilateral monopoly, negotiation, and bargaining power. Bilateral monopoly 
arises when two firms that want to deal with each other are both in a monopolistic 
position on their own side of the market. In this situation, the terms of exchange 
transactions-both price and quantity-are subject to bargaining and are settled 
by agreement. The quantity agreed upon may or may not maximize the sum of the 
two firms' profits; if it does not, there is always a possibility of adjusting the 
quantity exchanged to the amount which does. A stable agreement is reached only 
at the quantity which maximizes the sum of their profits independently of what 
price they agree upon, for the price determines only the share of the two firms in 
their combined profits. 
Therefore, even economists who have concluded that the quantity which will 
be exchanged in this market situation is determinant-and equal to the "optimal" 
competitive output9-agree on the theoretical indeterminateness of the price of 
the product passing from the monopolist to the monopsonist. Whatever the price, 
limited only by the range from the low monopsony to the high monopoly prices, 
it will not affect the quantity produced but only the division of the combined 
profits. To the extent that the two parties can be expected to face each other 
on equal footing, a price outcome closer to the competitive level than under 
either one-sided monopoly or monopsony is suggested. 
Similar to considering bargaining power as one among many factors account-
ing for price, another approach is to identify it as the ability to settle price 
within the range of theoretical indeterminancy in bilateral monopoly. That is, 
when competitive influences are too imperfect to compel price and quantity out-
comes at equilibrium levels, firms with bargaining power will be able to exercise 
discretion in finally establishing a price. This suggests a dichotomy between 
competitive or market forces on one hand and discretionary power in settling 
theoretically indeterminant prices on the other. In practice, use of bargaining 
power in this sense will lead some people to see price determination through 
development of bargaining power as an alternative to prices determined by market 
forces. It is reasonably clear, however, that all of what has been called bargain-
ing power by the various writers is present in market situations where prices are 
theoretically determinant; hence, bargaining power involves in large part the use 
of competitive influences to establish prices more favorable than those otherwise 
prevailing. 
Likewise, it does not seem that the concept can be limited usefully to mean 
negotiation. In fact 1 ability and willingness to bargain probably have little to do 
with bargaining power. Consider a monopsonistic firm buying from a competitive 
9see J. A. Nordin 1 "Resource Allocation in Relation to Partly Competitive System, " 
in this report. For a convincing argument that bilateral monopoly at best appears 
to result only in the simple monopoly output, see McKie, J. W., @.cit., pp. 
15-20. Whatever the quantity outcome, both authors agree that price only dis-
tributes profits (according to relative bargaining power.) 
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industry. This is a classic case of unequal bargaining power; bargaining o as 
haggling or negotiation, is not necessary at all in this situation. 
Objection can also be entered against identifying bargaining power with 
monopoly power. Monopoly or market power results from the ability of one firm 
to restrict competition through control over its own and its competitors' market 
behavior, most often involving influence over the supply of a product. A firm's 
monopoly power extends over its competitors on the same side of the marle'E~t; 
a seller has monopoly power over competing sellers, a buyer over competing 
buyers. However, bargaining power must be defined and measured relative to 
firms on the other side of the markeL Monopoly power may be necessary to the 
existence of bargaining power o but it is not sufficienL Thus o a monopsonist 
has bargaining power relative to competitive sellers. Organization of the sellers 
into collective monopoly will not change the degree on monopoly on the buying 
side, but can be expected substantially to reduce the monopsonist's bargaining 
power. 
The main purport of this discussion is that it well may be impossible to 
specify bargaining power as a factor in price determination and necessary to 
accept the term as summing up all forces which influence prices. This con-
clusion has been strongly stated by Lindblom. "The confusion over the meaning 
of the term is regrettable, the need for the term is doubtful o and the implication 
that bargaining power necessarily has something to do with bargaining is false. 
Relative strength in bargaining power must simply be read as a general advantage 
over an opposing buyer or seller in establishing on the market the terms desired, 
any attempt to narrow the term to consider it as a distinguishable factor among 
others being doomed to failure. nl 0 
Methods and Consequences of Manipulating Bargaining Power 
If it is agreed that bargaining power expresses a conclusion about the 
totality of all market forces influencing prices o then manipulation of bargaining 
power would include any action by which a firm attempts to establish more favor-
able prices than those previously prevailing. Frequently firms accept or reject 
the first price offered without considering the possibilities of altering the terms 
of exchange-conduct which economists associate with pure competition. In 
other cases o firms attempt to secure a more advantageous position in buying and/ 
or selling transactions which significantly influence income flows. 
Potential gain from manipulating bargaining power depends on the extent 
to which a firm can limit the alternatives available to its market opponents or 
extend its own alternatives. For example, a selling firm can initiate a new 
product or differentiate his product by endowing it with some unique character-
istic, or it can incorporate into its product some chararacteristic previously 
1 0c. E. Lindblom o "Bargaining Power in Price and Wage Determination, " 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, VoL LXIIa No. 3 {May 1948) o p. 407. 
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offered by competing sellers. It can advertise to uncover alternative buyers, 
reducing the necessity to sell at terms on which agreement is possible with cur-
rent buyers. It can attempt coercive actions against buyers to force agreement 
on more favorable terms. 
The ability to get more implies not merely the chance to ask for more (recog-
nition and freedom from institutional constraints) and the ability to hold out and 
fight for more (staying power), but also an ability of the other party to give more.ll 
Consider a group of agricultural producers which has always accepted the price 
buyers first offer. Now the producers get legal sanction to form a cartel, secure 
a full-supply contract with buyers, and possess unlimited funds to divert supplies 
to surplus usage. In other words, they have what it takes to get substantially 
more than is first offered. How much more can they get? 
This question can only be answered in terms of a specified time period. In 
the short run, the potential price gain for the sellers depends primarily on the 
increase in prices the buyers of their product can charge without much affecting 
volume ... also the extent to which the buyers are able to hold their expenditures 
in line by lowering prices they pay to suppliers of other products or complementary 
factors of production. Perhaps if buyers may not be able to pay another cent they 
will be forced out of business. The increased bargaining power of the sellers 
would then be of no avail. Expressed in the extreme, "Even if you take from the 
other fellow all he has you can't get much if he hasn't got anything! " 
In the longer run conditions of substitutability provide upper limits on the 
potential gain. Such substitution is possible at the point of final consumption 
(shift in level of demand due to substitution of competing products) or at the point 
of first sale (entry of new producers or foreign imports). Possibilities of substi-
tution at one or more levels mean that potential gains may be relatively great in 
the short run but almost nonexistent when long-run considerations are introduced. 
This point explains one reason why the concept of bargaining power gives 
rise to so much confusion. Because the scope of competitive factors increases 
with the shift from short-run to long-run analysis, potential gain from increased 
bargaining power must be estimated with reference to a specified period of adjust-
ment. In this connection, we observe that attempts to identify different kinds of 
bargaining power often involve nothing more than implicit recognition of the time 
dimension.12 In the long-run, competitive forces obviously impose stricter condi-
tions for the acquisition of bargaining power and narrower limits upon its exercise. 
The forces involved are always the same; their relative importance may vary 
depending on the time period involved. 
11compare Ladd and Strain, Q2. cit., pp. 4-5. 
12For one classification of the "kinds" of bargaining power, see Ladd and Strain, 
QP. cit. , p. 3. For another, see R. L. Clodius, "Opportunities and Limitations 
in Improving the Bargaining Power of Farmers," Problems and Policies of American 
Agriculture, Center for Agricultural Adjustment (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 
1959) 1 PPo 304-321. 
6 
Manipulation through horizontal combination. Possibilities may exist by 
which firms can unilaterally attempt to obtain and exercise power over price. 
There is, however 1 a second method by which bargaining power can be manipu-
lated; whether the number of competitors is large or small, they might improve 
their position in the market by agreeing to act collectively. That is, a seller 
can gain relative advantage to the extent to which elimination of interseller 
competition insures that others do not undercut the terms he offers to buyers. 
By restricting inter seller competition 1 such agreements reduce the possibility 
of substitution among products of participating firms. The sellers, acting in 
concert 1 and thus incurring no risk of losing customers to each other 1 improve 
their prospects for obtaining more favorable terms. Clearly, much of the cur-
rent discussion about bargaining power for agriculture would involve some kind 
of collective action. 
There are several ways in which rival firms can 1 by agreement, rule out 
competition among themselves and enhance their market power. Such agreements 
may take a variety of forms ranging from informal rules on business practices to 
detailed regulation of all facets of market behavior. One type of agreement 
restricts total output by limiting production of each party to the agreement (market-
ing quotas). Another type divides the market into several parts and practices 
price discrimination (fluid milk). A third sets prices and permits buyers to choose 
quantities (labor unions). 
As a general rule 1 the more comprehensive the alliance 1 the greater the 
increase in bargaining power and the larger the potential gain. This principle 
is related to the substitution possibilities discussed above. If alternative sup-
plies are adequate and readily available, buyers can turn to other sources 1 
leaving an organized group of sellers with no bargaining power. 
But bargaining power is not assured even if an organization embraces all 
producers of a certain product. Collective action must be based on prior bargain-
ing among those who are participating. What happens when the parties to the 
agreement operate under different cost conditions, have different values 1 and 
appraise the market situation differently? This situation is like when large num-
bers of producers in widely scattered areas are involved. Under such conditions 
the common terms to be offered to sellers require compromise. Since each seller 
is anxious to receive a "fair" share of the total gain, the market offer adopted 
will be subject to the constraint that each firm maintains a satisfactory share of 
the total sales. The larger the number and the less homogeneous the members 
of the coalition, the greater the likelihood of disagreement on common terms and 
the tendency to disintegration. 
A corollary of the difficulty in arriving at common terms is the tendency 
for combinations to be directed at limited objectives. For instance, a national 
association of livestock producers might attempt to bargain with packers over 
minimum prices to be paid for livestock of various kinds, weights, grades, and 
location I but leave packers free to choose how many head and from whom to buy. 
Competition among members of the association over other aspects of their market 
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offers might actually be stimulated as an indirect result of the agreement on one 
or more limited objectives. 
In summary 1 combination among competitors for collective action is one 
means of shifting relative bargaining power. The more comprehensive the 
coalition-both in number of participants and scope of the agreement-the 
greater the potential gain, the more competition is transferred from the organiza-
tion and its market opponents to a struggle among firms within its limits, and the 
more competition may be redirected along other lines not covered by the agree-
ment. Interestingly enoughu the source of its strength is the source of its weak-
ness as well. 
Consequences of shifts in relative bargaining power. A shift in the distribu-
tion of bargaining power among economic groups is manifested through relative 
price changes. Prices in turn are related both to resource allocation and to income 
distribution. Hence, manipulation of bargaining power involves two major areas 
of social concern with the performance of the economy. 
With regard to resource allocation, the important question is the effect of 
shifts in relative prices on the level and composition of real output. Does aggre-
gate demand decrease because quantities demanded of some commodities contract 
more rapidly in response to the changes in relative prices than others increase? 
Is the movement in relative prices likely to lead to a more or less preferred allo-
cation of resources under existing restraints? I am aware of no generally accepted 
analysis which permits definitive answers to questions about the effects of rela-
tive price changes on the demand and supply of real output. 
Relative price changes in favor of the products of one sector also imply an 
increase in total income accruing to resources used in that sector. Reactions in 
exchange relationships themselves and broader political considerations impose 
limits on the concentration of income in the hands of groups with increased bar-
gaining power. Combination may be met by countercombination, restraining 
potential gain beyond upper limits set by possibilities of substitution and internal 
competitive struggles. Those whose economic position is weakened can seek 
government action to curb the coalition or redress the unfavorable distribution of 
bargaining power. In general, public policy is opposed to the development of 
bargaining power by some firms and industries relative to other parts of the econ-
omy. Participation by government or the granting of a special status by statute 
would appear to be a prerequisite to collective action to improve bargaining 
power, as illustrated by such cases as labor unions, farm cooperatives I and util-
ities. 
Relevance of Increased Farmers' Bargaining Power 
as an Agricultural Policy Objective 
This paper argues that the concept of bargaining power is most logically used 
to sum up overall advantages or inequalities in price-influencing abilities. Recog-
nition of this comprehensive nature of the concept could explain why most persons 
8 
concerned with agriculture seem to agree on the desirability of increasing farmers' 
bargaining power, although they cannot agree on the means to accomplish this end o 
However, this comprehensive concept is probably not the thing most people 
are talking about when they say that farmers are at a disadvantage in the market 
relative to the marketing and supply firms with which they deal. Here, the overall 
concept includes too much; what is needed is a concept which concentrates on the 
relative positions of buying and selling firms in specified markets. There appears 
to be a significant difference between the statement that "farmers have no bargain-
ing power" and the claim that "farmers have less bargaining power than the firms 
from which they buy and sell, " 
This point can be expected to play an important role in consideration of any 
proposals to give farmers more bargaining power. The narrower question is whether 
producers as a group are at a relative disadvantage to marketing and supply firms 
as a group. Even if this question is answered in the affirmative, a choice must 
still be made whether to equalize the situation (1) by giving farmers more bargain-
ing power or (2) by reducing bargaining power in the marketing and supply sectors. 
Choice of the latter course of action is clearly most consistent with general public 
policy in matters of competition and monopoly. However, it appears that the pub-
lic might be quite willing to grant considerable freedom to farmers to act collectively 
to strengthen their market position based on the narrow justification of inequality 
in price determination relative to industrial firms to which they sell and from whom 
they buy. Perhaps the most relevant example here is the freedom granted labor 
unions and their exemption from antitrust legislation. 
The broader question is the extent to which collective action by farmers will 
be made permissive for the purpose of gaining sufficient market control to raise 
prices and increase income. Programs designed to accomplish this end may be 
operated by government or by farmers themselves on a do-it-yourself basis 0 
Certainly 1 the latter would necessitate a substantial exemption to farmers from 
antitrust and related regulatory statutes. If the government does not operate the 
program 1 the public may be unwilling to concur in this large a grant of monopoly 
power to farmers. At a minimum, some fairly specific rules to limit the methods 
to be used and the extent to which prices can be increased are likely to be estab-
lished. 
POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED 
BARGAINING POWER FOR AGRICULTURE 
by 
Arnold Paulsen! 
and 
Don Kaldor2 
Farm producers have long speculated about the possibilities of bargaining 
power as a device to improve their incomes. Concern over lack of bargaining 
power is expressed in the frequent comment of farm people that, "Our trouble is 
we have to pay what 1 s asked when we go to the store and take what 1 s offered for 
what we have to sell. " Some farmers feel there is something wrong with the 
system which puts them in a squeeze between rising costs for machinery, land, 
fuel, and labor and decreasing prices for products and even decreasing total 
value of output. Individually, they feel helpless to change the situation. 
Some producers would like to break the grip of the economic squeeze. 
They would like to move from a passive to an active role with respect to the 
prices they receive, the costs they pay, and the rate of return they accept on 
their labor and capital. To become active some feel they need power to control 
their markets. Farmers have watched the activities of laborers in industry and 
observed how they have gained a measure of power by acting collectively. 
Some merely feel that bargaining power is worth a try, while others valiantly 
declare that collective action is the only way individual producers can gain 
market strength. 
Bargaining power can be thought of as the ability to influence the terms 
of trade and the conditions of sale in product of factor markets. In the case 
of agriculture, this implies some sort of collective action on the part of many 
sellers. There are two approaches to this collective action. (:i} Government 
can aid in bringing unity. (2) Producers themselves can operate within the 
present laws or a somewhat more permissive set of rules. 
The political possibility of obtaining and exercising a franchise for col-
lective bargaining in agriculture is discussed in another paper. In this paper 
we discuss only the possibilities and consequences of bargaining power. 
We shall assume that (l) farm producers have agreed to act collectively, 
and (2) society has granted permission for farmers to act collectively. We shall 
look at the alternative ways or directions in which a decision-making unit might 
exercise bargaining power and evaluate the consequences. 
l Assistant Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. 
2Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. 
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Economic Policy Model 
Let us assume the goal of the producer group is to improve the terms of 
trade for farm products and thereby increase the returns in agriculture relative 
to other parts of the economy. The terms of trade for agriculture can be improved 
by influencing supply or demand variables. However 1 some variables are more 
difficult or expensive to control than others. Devices used to manipulate the 
variables may be called instruments. Instruments include such things as 
(l) promotion to influence consumers preferences 1 (2) compulsory acreage allot-
ments to reduce the land input and hence the total quantity of products supplied, 
or (3) liberalized immigration laws to increase population. 
In most cases 1 a number of different instruments might be used to influence 
a given variable. They involve different costs and problems of administration. 
Each instrument is likely to generate different side effects. In selecting an 
instrument from a producer standpoint, it is therefore necessary to compare costs 
of the various instruments in moving a variable a given amount. However, society 
as a whole is concerned with all direct and side effects generated by an instrument. 
Society's evaluation of the desirability of employing an instrument is based on 
additional consequences--both costs and benefits. 
Society has set up rules to govern use of instruments by various groups. 
The rules are subject to change depending on the disagreeableness to society of 
the direct and side effects of using the instruments. Political acquiescence is 
a permission of the moment. Rules which, at the moment, grant permission for 
the use of certain instruments may be expanded or contracted in a relatively 
short time. 
The array of economically feasible instruments is also constantly changing. 
As science and imagination progress 1 new instruments are devised which are 
less costly. The variables which influence the terms of trade are relatively 
stable. The internal linkages within the agricultural economy are relatively 
stable. However 1 the relationships among variables change in time though in 
a relatively predictable manner. 
To summarize 1 the terms of trade are improved through the manipulation of 
variables. Variables are moved by instruments. Instruments are available through 
acquiescence or direct permission of society. Improving the terms of trade is 
limited (l) by what is technically possible to do with the variables in the system, 
(2) by what is economically feasible 1 (i.e. , which benefit the group using them 
more than they cost) and ( 3) by what is politically acceptable. 
Demand 1 Supply Variables and Terms of Trade 
Let us focus on the variables and technical possibilities of improving the 
terms of trade for agriculture. Perhaps the best way to look at the array of vari-
ables is in outline form. The terms of trade can be influenced by manipulating 
demand variables or supply variables, There may be some possibility of improv-
ing the terms of trade indirectly through a number of other factors called conditions 
11 
of product sale. Let us ignore for a r;noment most questions involving the selec-
tion of instruments to control the variables. The following variables will be 
discussed. 
I. Demand variables 
A. Population 
1 . Immigration 
2. Natural increase (excess of births over deaths; achieved by 
lengthening life or increasing live births) 
B. Income 
1. Level 
2. Distribution 
C. Preferences 
1. Appeal of competing products (high income elastic nonagricultural; 
tax and color of oleo) 
2. Appeal of own product (subsidy, advertising 1 promotion 1 
nutrition research) 
D. Prices and quantities of competing products 
E. Margins in marketing sector 
1. Rate of return on marketing resources 
2. Number of resources needed 
II. Supply variables 
A. Quantity of product placed on market 
1. In total 
2. On particular markets (multiple pricing) 
3. Distribution over time (pork seasonality - quantity and elasticity 
decrease in summer) 
B. Price of inputs (increase pressure for internal disintegration) 
1. Return to resources used as inputs or used in making inputs 
2. Number of resources used in making inputs 
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C. Quantity of inputs 
1. Decrease competing resources (other countries I regions 1 firms 1 
new resources in other firms) 
2. Increase complementary resources (those which raise average 
product) 
D. Changes in production possibilities 
1. Rate 
2. Volume 
3. Type 
III. Conditions of product sale (indirect effect on terms of trade) 
A. Product differentiation and multiple pricing (limited by change in total 
cost equal to or less than change in total revenue) 
B. Market reporting and sale information (microproduct mix adjustment. 
Laurence Abbott, Quality and Competition) 
C. Quality and purity preservation (export wheat 1 highly perishable 
vegetables) 
D. Pricing practices to expand market (introductory offer, spoiling 
the market) 
E. Margin variation to decrease not increase price flexibility 
F. Product service as well as sale to expand market (IBM 1 soybean 
association) 
Demand variables. Let us portray the consumer level demand curve as in 
Fig. l. Quantity taken increases as price declines. Below and to the left of the 
consumer level demand curve lies the farm level demand curve. In this diagram 
it is separated by a constant farm to retail spread throughout the quantity range. 
To illustrate 1 OQ represents the quantity of pork sold per person in the United 
States in 1958-60 pounds per person. In that year the consumer paid an average 
of 62 cents per pound for pork. Putting it another way, consistently to move the 
volume of pork which was coming on the market, wholesalers and retailers found 
necessary an average price of 62 cents per pound at retail. After marketing 1 
processing, and distribution costs and the shrinkage of the animals were sub-
tracted, (42 cents per pound) farmers were paid 19 cents per pound liveweight 
for the hogs. 
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Obviously 1 if more people had been present in the United States some-
thing less than 60 pounds per capita would have been available and pork 
presumably would have sold for a higher price. An increase in population 
would improve the terms of trade for agriculture. This could be accomplished 
through increased immigration or by influencing the natural rate of population 
increase. 
The level of income influences the position of the consumer level demand 
curve. As people become wealthier 1 their demand for food rises somewhat 
except for so-called inferior goods such as dry beans and wheat. However 1 
the increase is small: the added income is likely to be spent mostly on nonfood 
rather than food items. Increasing the income of low income people boosts 
demand for food more than increasing the income of high income people. Thus 
the terms of trade for agriculture could be influenced somewhat by varying the 
level and distribution of income. 3 
3wetmore I et. al. "Expanding the Demand for Farm Products 1 " Technical 
Bulletin 2 3 1 University of Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station 1 April 1959 1 
pp. 54-64. 
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The consumption of any product such as eggs or beef is influenced by 
the presence, appeal, and price of other products o In general, the presence 
of and consumer desire for many nonfood items will depress somewhat the 
demand for food. For example, a working girl may see a dress which is just 
exactly what she needs, and although it's very expensive, she is determined 
to have it. She may save a little each day on her food bill to buy it. On the 
other hand 1 food consumption was high during World War II when nonfood 
consumer items were scarce and people apparently indulged in large quantities 
of relatively expensive food. 
One food item influences the demand curve for another. The price of 
beef influences the demand curve for pork. The tax on oleomargarine and 
prevention of its coloration probably enhanced the demand for butter. The 
demand for a product will be expanded by a tax or adverse publicity on 
substitute items quite as readily as by subsidy, promotion or favorable 
nutrition research on its behalf. 
By reducing marketing margins the demand curve at the farm level can 
be moved upward and to the right without moving the consumer level demand 
curve. This type of movement has been a favorite wish of farm producers for 
many years. There are two obvious possibilities: 0) Reduce the rate of 
returns on resources used in the marketing, processing, and retailing sector o 
(2) Reduce the number of resources needed by adoption of newer'" more 
efficient techniques in marketing, 
Working on any or all the demand variables gives the same effecL The 
demand curve at the farm level moves upward and to the right. Such a move-
ment affects the terms of trade differently over the short run and long run. In 
fig. 2 we consider the case of a single product or a group of closely 
competitive products such as meat. 
In a period so short that the supply is perfectly inelastic (that is, 
quantity supplied is constant) (S 1 in fig. 2), any increase in demand will be 
reflected entirely in a price rise. This will mean an increase in returns to 
resources in the production of the product, As a result, relative returns wi.ll 
become more favorable in this enter prise 0 
Over a longer time 1 the supply will be more elastic. Producers, free to 
shift resources, will expand production of the product for which there is 
increased demand. In the next period I the price will decline. The amount of 
price decline will depend on the long-run elasticity of supply. If supply is 
perfectly elastic (S2) (that is 1 producers are willing to supply all the market 
will take at the old price}, the price will decline to the original level 0 The 
increase in demand will show up entirely as expansion in quantity exchanged, 
Supplv is likely to be highly elastic when the product absorbs a small propor-
tion of total farm resources and substantial resources are readily adaptable to 
produce the product. This is probably the case for Idaho potatoes, Iowa pork, 
or Illinois soybeans. In these cases, the price effect of the demand increase 
Q) 
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Fig. 2. Short and long run effects of demand increase on 
total revenue 
is quickly dissipated over the whole farm industry. On the other hand, if the 
product absorbs a large proportion of total farm resources (such as feed grains), 
and/or resources in alternative uses cannot be readily adapted to the production 
of the product (maple syrup or cranberries), the supply is likely to be quite 
inelastic. If the supply is rather inelastic even in the long run, the increase in 
demand will induce a more permanent price rise. However, resource returns at 
the margin in the enterprise will not remain above the levels offered at the 
margin by production of other farm products. But average rates of return might 
remain separated for some time. 
A demand increase for a particular product may be largely at the expense 
of other farm products. (For example people may decide to eat more pork and 
less beef.) When this is the case, the elasticity of supply of the particular 
product, pork for example, probably will be relatively large, and the price 
effect will be dissipated quickly. An expansion of demand for one meat at the 
expense of another will produce a shift in resource use among the two classes 
of livestock on farms. Resource returns in the enterprise expanding or in the 
industry as a whole may show little or no long-run improvement. 
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Even if the expanded demand is not at the expense of other farm products, 
the effect on resource returns may be more to the whole industry than to the 
particular enterprise. This is probably the case for soybeans, for which demand 
has grown rapidly. Expansion of the demand for soybeans has moved resources 
into soybean production, and out of feed grain and other production. Higher 
resource returns or smaller surpluses in the whole feed-livestock economy have 
probably resulted. 
How much this shift in resources will affect the whole industry depends 
on the magnitude of the increased demand and the elasticity of aggregate supply. 
Since aggregate supply appears to be highly inelastic in the short run, the short 
run effect of expanded demand not at the expense of other products would be 
mostly to increase prices and not to expand total output. 
Unfortunately the opportunity for expanding demand, especially of the 
noncompetitive variety, is relatively small, as summarized at a previous 
seminar, especially by Fox at that seminar. 4 
Supply variables. On the supply side, the terms of trade for agriculture 
could be influenced in two main ways: (1) Vary the position of the supply func-
tion. (2) Choose a more favorable point on the present supply function. 
The total quantity supplied could be controlled directly or indirect! y. 
That is, it could be reduced by restricting marketings or by limiting the quantity 
of inputs used in production. The price of agricultural products rises so 
sharply as output drops that a smaller quantity sells for more total money than a 
larger quartity. For example the total value of hogs in 1958 was $3.4 billion, 
while in 1960 it was $2.9 billion. The volume was abuut 13 percent larger in 
1960 but the value of farm sales, 15 percent lower. 
Because of recent purchases by government I a reduction of 6 to 8 per-
cent in grain production presently would be necessary before prices would rise. 
After such a cut, further reductions in production would not raise prices if 
society chose to release present stored stocks. 
The potential is large, however 1 for increasing the total return by con-
trolling supply. 5 The average total retail value of pork and beef combined could 
have been about 13 percent larger from 1949 to 1958 if 18 percent less beef 
and 16 percent less pork had been sold. This would be 50 pounds of pork per 
4 Demand for Farm Products, CAA Report l_, Center for Agricultural Adjustment, 
5 Iowa State University, 19 59 . 
The numerical estimates made in this section were based on demand equations 
provided by Wilbur Maki. The use of the equations and the accuracy of the 
calculations are the responsibility of the authors. 
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person per year instead of 59, and 60 pounds of beef instead of 71. Prices at 
retail would have been 35 percent higher if volume had been cut this much. 
Farm prices might have been up 50 percent. Net farm income from hogs and cattle 
probably would have about doubled. 
Even more drastic cuts in production and still higher prices could be 
imagined. The maximum value of farm sales of meat animals would occur at a 
lower per capita consumption than indicated above. The net income would con-
tinue to rise even as output was cut below the level that would bring the greatest 
total value of sales. Net income of all ope:r;ators would be a maximum when the 
quantity was set so that the last truckload of hogs sent to market added to total 
value of sales just what it cost to produce them. The total hogs marketed would, 
of course, sell at that point for perhaps much more than what it cost to produce 
them, since average revenue would be greater than marginal revenue. 
These are rough estimates for the short ·run. Over a longer period the 
demand would become more elastic, and the production of substitute products 
would rise. As this happened the price received for a reduced volume of one or 
two meats would sink. Put another way, if a 30 percent cut were required in 
one year to raise hog prices above $25 per cwt. then to maintain prices at that 
level would require further cuts in supplies each year. There may be errors in 
the quantities estimated because we have no experience with even a 20 percent 
cut in per capita consumption. We cannot use the same relationships for large 
changes as we use for small changes. 
Furthermore, a monopolist usually hesitates fully to exploit his position. 
A producer group would realize that the public would react negatively to agri-
cultural bargaining power obtained through controlling supply if food prices 
became too high. Furthermore, informed producer groups would recognize that 
high prices and scarce quantities would make unity among farmers more difficult 
to maintain. This situation would also encourage the entry of other producers, 
regions, and even couqtries into the market. Therefore, the maximum revenue 
quantities should not be considered goals that would be striven for but only 
illustrations of the way in which control of supply could improve terms of trade. 
There would be no need to induce farmers to cut supply; it is profitable 
for them to do so. But, we all know they do not readily agree to work together to 
attain this goal. 
Let us return to the short-run and long-run effects on the terms of trade 
of operating at a highly favorable point on the supply function. Improving the 
price of one commodity through controlling the supply, such as hog's, would 
cause a reaction in, close substitutes such as beef and broilers. The long-run 
gains from controlling supply depend on the closeness of substitutes and the 
willingness of producers of the substitutes to expand and supply the demand. If 
there is a perfect substitute and the substitute producer will supply all the de-
mand without a price rise, there is no long-run gain from controlling the supply of 
the particular product. This is probably the case with two brands of gasoline. 
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If one company tried to improve its terms of trade by closing gas stations, 
customers might be able to buy all they wanted at a competing company's 
stations at the regular price. The first company ·could cut supply repeatedly 
until it had no more stations and still would not have improved its terms of 
trade. 
In addition to. varying total supply, a_barg aining unit.might_ try to institute 
multiple prices and allocate the supply a.mong markets. There are two conditions 
for potential success. (1) The markets must be clearly separated so that 
quantities offered in one market will not flow into other markets. (2) The 
demands must exhibit different price elasticities. Under these conditions, the 
bargaining unit can increase total revenue by selling the product for different 
prices in different markets. From the producer's standpoint, the best allocation 
of product between the two markets is that which maximizes total revenue. This 
will occur when marginal revenue is the same in the different markets. This 
requires setting a relatively high price in the more inelastic markets and a 
relatively low price in the more elastic markets. Thus, his goal is to sell a 
limited quantity in the inelastic market and more than previously in the elastic 
market. If the elasticities are greatly different over a wide range of quantities, 
reallocation among markets and price discrimination can produce a large 
increase in total revenue. For example, a two-price plan for wheat might sell 
a slightly smaller quantity in the domestic food market at a substantially higher-
than-present price. The remainder would be sold for less than pr:esent prices 
on the export and feed grain market~ The result would be increased total value 
of wheat crops. Price discrimination has been forbidden by Federal law bJ.lt is 
practiced with immunity in a number of agricultural markets -- milk, oranges, 
cranberries, and nuts, for example. 
Total return from a given sized crop can also be increased sometimes by 
influencing the time when products flow to market. This can be accomplished 
partly by storage and also by collective production planning. Oran~~ and apple 
producers frequently vary the time pattern of crop delivery to market to increase 
its total value. It would be foolish for a bargaining agent to send another load 
of produce to market this week if such action would only decrease the total 
return for the week's shipment. Destroying it, diverting it to some other use, 
or holding it until:next·w·eek would seem only logical. Presently, in most 
agricultural markets the last loads of produce to arrive at the market during a 
week or month reduce the total value of the shipment. 
Acting collectively in the purchase of inputs would be only a small 
step if producers were acting collectively with respect to selling their products. 
It is apparent-that total return above out-of-pocket costs could be increased by 
lowering the cost of purchased inputs. Two possibilities exist. (1) Decrease 
the returns to resources used as inputs or used in making inputs. (2) Reduce 
the number of resources used in making purchased inputs. 
On the supply side, there are also variables associated with improve-
ments in production techniques. Let us say the cost per unit of input is stable. 
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The cost of production still could be decreased if fewer inputs were needed per 
unit of output. Most new technology increases output and worsens the terms of 
trade for agriculture after it has been generally adopted. Improvements in pro-
duction techniques might be regulated to lessen their depressing effect on the 
terms of trade for agriculture by: (l) controlling the amount and rate of release 
of new technology 1 or (2) selecting the products so only those with more 
elastic demands and mobile resources would be affected. 
Conditions of product sale. Actions ~esides specific manipulation of 
supply or demand variables may improve the terms of trade for agriculture. 
Conditions of sale in agricultural collective-bargaining contracts would be 
somewhat similar to the working-condition provisions usually included in labor 
contracts. Producers of farm products usually have no control over the way in 
which their product is handled after it leaves their ownership. However 1 in a 
collective-bargaining situation I producers could influence to some degree how 
products were marketed. If there were some advantage to them either directly 
or indirectly 1 one would anticipate that bargaining agents would try to specify 
certain conditions of sale. For example, producers might desire additional or 
less product differentiation 1 improved market reporting I quality and purity 
preservation 1 pricing practices which expand the market 1 different management 
of farm-retail margin variation over time, or additional product service to con-
sumers. The opportunity to make gains from any or all of these may be limited. 
In principle 1 however 1 they might have some indirect impact on the terms of 
trade. 
Product differentiation and multiple pricing might increase the total 
return for a given volume of output if some people prefer one of the differentiated 
products. 
Improved market reporting and sale information would make it possible 
for producers to gear their product mix more perfectly with the desires of the 
market and increase volume or price. The broad product mix usually considered 
by agricultural economists (eggs 1 milk 1 beef 1 potatoes I pork and oranges) is 
probably handled well by the price and market system. However I the price 
and market mechanism is not precise in reporting the values of alternative 
qualities of a specific product. These might involve gluten strength of wheat I 
meatiness in livestock or variety choice in grains or vegetables. These con-
sumer preferences could be reported to a bargaining group which would in turn 
relay the information to their producer members. 
The preservation of quality and purity sometimes concerns producers. 
Wheat growers have been irritated considerably by reports from foreign users 
that American wheat is occasionally adulterated with inert material. Highly 
perishable products such as bread or frozen foods presently are delivered on 
contract, spe dfying the exact way in which they will be cared for in the store. 
If producers could gain directly or indirectly through quality and purity pres-
ervation I they might ask or bargain for guarantees concerning the conditions 
relating to sale of the product. 
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To expand markets, farmers might encourage pricing practices designed 
to acquaint new consumers with the product. Producers might ask the merchan-
disers of the final product to help insure that newly acquired customers are 
retained or that the product is adjusted to their desires. 
Marketing margins vary between periods of low volume and high volume. 
There is some tendency to accept small margins when volume of farm production 
is low. During periods of seasonally low supply, competition among processors 
is keen. If marketing margins were larger rather than smaller than average at 
these times, the price to the farmers would be lower o but perhaps the over-
expansion of production in the next cycle would be less severe. Conversely 
there is also tendency to take large margins when volume of production is high 
because of reduced competition. Considering average total costs, margins 
might be smaller than average at such times because costs decline with 
increased volume. If they were small at times of heavy marketings, this would 
move a large production into consumption without depressing prices to farmers 
so much. Thus, if the cyclical pattern of marketing margins could be reversed, 
(that is, large margins accepted at low volume and low margins taken at high 
volume), demand would be more elastic at the farm level and livestock prices 
and production might become more stable. 
Producer manipulation of variables 0 Obviously o you will dismiss some 
of the supply and demand variables discussed above as beyond the practical 
control of producer groups. In almost all cases, the short-run gains of manip-
ulation appear larger than the long-run gains. 
Producecgroups are organized to some extent at the present time. We 
see them trying to manipulate some of the variables. For example, they try to 
expand the demand for their product. Through the use of Public Law 48 0 foreign 
currencies, several groups have tried to develop larger export markets for their 
products. With money collected from producers, some groups have worked on 
product development and searched for new uses for the product. Several 
producer groups have a production research committee which meets with 
scientists or may support scientists who explore the possibilities of new cost-
reducing technology. Commodity groups have long attempted cooperative 
selling to try to increase the total value of output by regulating the flow of a 
given sized crop to market and increasing competition in the marketing sector o 
Buying cooperatives also exist to try to reduce the cost of purchased inputs 
through making volume purchases and stimulating increased. competition for 
. their business among farm supply industries. There may be additional 
opportunities to improve the terms of trade for farm products in these ways. 
However I it appears that these opportunities are fairly small. Moreover I their 
exploitation by producer groups is likely to be costly with only negligible long-
run effects on resource returns in the industry. 
The chances are slight that producer groups can increase demand by 
controlling such variables as population, per capita income, and the price of 
competitive products. Congress controls the opportunity to influence the 
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distribution of income for food by means of food stamp plans I consumption 
subsidies 1 etc. Producer groups are limited to bringing political pressure on 
public decision-making units 1 particularly Congress. While some improvement 
in the terms of trade might be induced by a large food subsidy program for low 
income groups 1 such a program cannot be financed'. by private producer groups. 
It is on the supply side that opportunities are greatest for the producer 
to influence the terms of trade. Unquestionably th~ potential here is very large. 
To exploit these opportunities 1 instruments must be available to control market 
supplies directly or indirectly by influencing inputs or the transformation of 
inputs into outputs. Here we are not going to be concerned with details of the 
methods of control. Our interest is primarily in analyzing consequences that are 
common to most 1 if not all, methods of controlling supply. 
Consequences of Supply Control 
Programs of significant proportions to control supplies of a single major 
commodity are not likely to be permanent. A control program for a particular 
product is likely to lead either to retaliation by other producer groups or the 
imposition of general controls. Where there is an excess aggregate supply of 
farm products 1 there is little opportunity to shift surplus resource problems 
from one commodity to another without serious income effects on producers of 
the substitute products. Thus I the ensuing discussion of the consequences of 
supply control will focus on general controls. 
General controls to improve the terms of trade fall into two broad categories 
in terms of their consequences. (1) Some labor resources could be permitted to 
remain efficiently employed in agriculture; others would be removed and re-
employed outside agriculture where they might produce a product of larger value 
than that which they produced in agriculture. (2) All labor resources mi~ht be 
kept in agriculture and some either unemployed or used less efficiently. The 
effects of the two types of control programs on agriculture and the general 
economy are very different. Instruments (that is I farm programs or actions by 
producer groups) are available to prevent farm resources from producing so much. 
Compulsory quotas or universal voluntary farmer participation in a producer 
group slowdown or strike are examples. 
In the first case labor diverted from producing farm products are re-employed 
outside agriculture 1 the total real income of the system is increased 1 and income 
to farmers is increased relative to nonagriculture. This is a relatively pleasant 
situation; most segments of the economy are better off. For these ;shifts to 
occur 1 the labor resources must be re-employed in such a way that they produce 
outside agriculture products of more value than those which they earlier produced 
in agriculture. For this to be possible the resources must be mobile 1 and there 
must be productive opportunities to employ additional resources of the quality 
coming from agriculture. 
6 Programs not specifically designed to transfer resources may nonetheless create 
opportunities which eventually lead to transfer and re-employment. 
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If there exists substantial unemployment of labor similar to that released 
from agriculture by controlling supplyo the hope of re-employing the released 
labor may be dim. In addition, certain types of control programs may, at least 
for a time, make it difficult for released labor to be re-employed outside agricul-
ture. Thus o it may be worthwhile to look at the second case in which resources 
are unemployed or underemployed in the process of controlling supply and not 
re-employed at a·higher marginal value product as :i.n the first case. 
In this case o the total real income of the economy would be reduced, but 
the share of the total going to agriculture increased. In facto because of agri-
culture's relatively small size and the inelastic demand for its products, the 
total income of agriculture in real terms would be increased. The total pie would 
be slightly smaller, but agriculture would have a larger slice-more p:i.e than 
before. With more to divide among the same amount of resources, all resources 
including unemployed ones could receive more income than before controls. Of 
course, the increase in resource returns would be less than if some re-employ-
ment had taken place. Interestingly o it would appear that a voluntary supply 
control program which paid people not to produce could be self-financing from a 
producer group standpoint. 
When labor is not re-employed o the increase in farm real income is less 
than the decrease in nonfarm real income. It is true that the additional income 
received by agriculture is a pure transfer from nonagriculture, However the 
nonagricultural sector in addition is forced to consume a smaller volume of agri-
cultural products. Furthermore some loss of employment and real income occurs 
in the marketing o processing, and retailing sectors as a result of the smaller 
volume of agricultural production. 
The effects of controlling agricultural supplies without re-employing the 
released resources are almost exactly the reverse of the consequences of a 
technological advance in agriculture 0 As technology advanced in agriculture o 
output from given resources rose o food prices fell, total cost and percentage of 
income spent for food fell o average real income rose, and employment in manu-
facturing and service industries expanded. As a consequence agriculture e s real 
income fell and resources were beckoned to the non-agricultural sector. Econ-
omists said the adjustments were part of economic development, Controlling 
agricultural supply without re-employing the released resources o especially :i.f 
the released resources were of major proportions, say 2 0 to 25 percent, would 
result in less total output from given resources. Food prices would rise o total 
cost and percentage of income spent on food would rise, average real income 
would fall, employment in high income, elastic industries would fall. Resources 
would be less frantic to leave agriculture 0 
Regardless of unemployment or re-employment of resources, controlling 
agricultural supply and the resulting income transfer affect the nonfarm economy o 
As a result of paying more money for farm products o nonfarm people will have less 
money available to buy nonfarm products 0 This situation may be offset in total 
volume of spending by farmers' increased purchases of nonfarm products out of 
the additional or transferred income they receive. With incomes and prices con,-
stant in the nonfarm sector, the income transfer would not affect aggregate 
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spending for nonfarm goods if nonfarm people reacted exactly oppositely to a 
decrease in real income as farm people reacted to an increase in money and real 
income. Thus a perfect offset is possible. However 6 we believe the net effect 
of the transfer would be to increase aggregate spending for nonfarm goods and 
reduce savings I especially in the short run. 
The effect on the kinds of goods produced is interesting and would also be 
of concern to the voters. Re-employment again has an influence on the volume 
of goods but not a great effect on what kinds are produced. Momentarily after 
controls were placed on agricultural supply most people in the nonfarm economy 
would receive the same money income 1 but with larger sums spent on farm 
products they would have less available to buy other goods. Presumably they 
would cut purchases most on hi:gh-income elastic goods such as entertainment I 
recreation I education 1 and medical services. 
The farm sector 1 on the other hand I would experience an increase in 
income. Farmers might desire more conveniences both on the farm and in the 
home. There would be some reduction in the total demand for purchased farm 
inputs. Consumption good purchases probably would increase. There would be 
an adjustment required in the overall mix of goods and services produced. The 
additional items purchased by farm people would likely not be exactly the ones 
foregone by nonfarm people. 
Any supply control or bargaining power program changes the income 
distribution in the system. How much does society want to change the income 
distribution? How much of the benefits of technological advance would society 
permit to remain in agriculture as a result of bargaining power through supply 
control? 
Price Targets, Controls and Political Acquiescence 
A range of price targets is discussed by farm leaders. The 1960 corn 
support rate was at 65 percent of parity 6 and some discussion indicated that 90 
percent of parity was considered too low. There is no objective way for us to 
say what price targets ought to be. This is related to the distribution of income 
and the rate of real income growth. Both are a matter of much concern and 
disagreement among economic policymakers. 
The use of some instruments to reduce the quantity placed on the market 
and hence fix prices and raise farm income would probably be accepted by 
society at this time. It might even be accepted for producer groups to do this 
themselves if they were able. This would be the granting of a franchise to 
operate a monopoly. The principles discussed in Dr. Nordin's paper apply to 
this monopoly as well as any other. At the same time, it must be remembered 
the public has several antitrust and price-fixing laws to regulate monopolies. 
With large surplus stocks of farm products held by the government and 
farm incomes apparently still below the level society desires, agriculture might 
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be able to obtain a franchise to operate as a regulated monopoly. An offer by 
agricultural producers to "do it themselves" by collective bargaining might be 
preferred to the present set of relatively expensive farm income support programs. 
Theoretically 1 larger incomes could be obtained for agriculture through the market 
place by reduced supply. However I society would probably limit the operations 
of producer groups which attempted to raise prices to very high levels. 
ROLE OF LAND-GRANT COLLEGES IN SUCCESS AND/ OR 
FAILURE OF BARGAINING POWER PROPOSALS 
by W. G. Stuckyl 
In previous sessions of this seminar I papers have examined the principles 
of monopoly and the economics of influencing terms of trade and conditions of 
sale in product and factor markets. These papers have provided a point of depar-
ture for discussing the probabilities of success or failure by food producers in 
reaping gains from bargaining power. Some will say we pass now from scientific 
objectivity to conjecture. Even so, the probability of success is fully as im-
portant as the size of the gains if success is obtained. 
Paulsen and Kaldor rightly state that there is no scientific way to say what 
price targets ought to be; that these are related to the distribution of income and the 
rate of real income growth. 2 One's position on income distribution and growth is 
based on goals and values. Therefore, people find themselves in.conflict and 
disagreement. Reasonable people can reasonably disagree on th~se issues. 
Whether proposals to improve the bargaining power of producers ought to 
fail or to succeed is a controversial issue. The determination of this issue can 
be influenced as much or more by the side effects outside agriculture as by the 
gains to producers. 
The Issues 
The exercise of bargaining power probably would involve a reduction in 
supplies and an increase in prices. The issues can be posed in terms of gains 
and losses as viewed by producers 1 consumers, and society as a whole. Each 
would gain or lose freedom of individual decision 1 and overall real income. 
Each voter, each groU:p,,and society as a whole must decide whether granting 
bargaining power to producers would increase or decrease his sense of well-
being. 
1. The producer probably would gain income stability and/or higher real 
income through the exercise ·of bargaining pow.er. However, he would have 
to give up some freedom to choose (l) what to produce and (2) how 
much to produce. The main issues are : (l) To what degree is the 
individual producer willing to vest the power of these decisions in a 
central authority? (2) Is the gain in producer income and stability worth 
the loss in freedom to him? 
1 Educational.Leade.r ,Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment, Iowa State 
University. 
2 See Arnold Paulsen and Don Kaldor 1 "Possibilities and Consequences of Increased 
Bargaining Power for Agriculture," Bargaining Power in Agriculture (this report), 
Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment, (Ames: Iowa State University 
Printing Service, l96l).,p. 23. 
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2. The consumer would pay a higher price for relatively less agricultural 
commodities. Alternatively 1 consumers, as is the case now 1 could have 
relatively abundant and cheap farm products and pay through taxes to 
support farm income. If we assume farm income is to be supported in any 
case, the choices are {1) between providing this income by taxes or by 
higher food prices and (2) between abundant food and less abundant food. 
3. Society as a whole is concerned with the desirability of concentrating 
power to regulate the supply of a basic necessity of life such as food. Is it 
desirable to vest this important power in the hands of minority interests 1 or 
is this power safe only when in the hands of people acting through their 
government? Or is the society better off to avoid any concentration of the 
decisions affecting the supply of food? 
4. The well-being of society is also affected by how the economic system 
grows and reallocates resources. Will improved methods of production still 
be rapidly discovered and adopted? Would resources move quickly to more 
productive I less wasteful uses? And finally does society feel that higher 
returns for producers of food are justified? Would society be better off if 
farm people received a return on their capital and labor closer to those 
levels achieved outside farming? 
All the above issues are of public concern. They affect the position of 
individuals, groups I and society as a whole with respect to granting monopoly 
power to agriculture producers. In a democracy, the conflicting interests and 
positions of parts of society will be represented and the issue decided through 
the political process. The issues are dealt with either by action or inaction 
according to the beliefs of the people. These beliefs are influenced by the level 
of understanding the people possess concerning the problem situation 1 their 
goals I and the environment in which the- problems must be solved. All public 
decisions I but especially complex decisions 1 have special implications for 
education. 
It is the business of the land-grant institutions to find and interpret 
relevant data pertaining to the developmental needs of the society it serves. 
On matters of public concern 1 especially on crucial public problems 1 the colleges 
can define the issues I clarify goals 1 and project the consequences of alter-
native responses. These are the essential ingredients of decisions by a free 
people. Rational and informed consideration of all of them by the voters enables 
a democracy to reach enlightened decisions. Educational service permits the 
people to arrive at decisions faster 1 make fewer mistakes 1 and limit the number 
of important problems that go neglected. 
The problem that plagues educators in the land-grant institutions 1 and 
especially extension workers I is that the bargaining power issue contains 
conflicts of interest between the producing segment--the sellers--and the 
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consuming segment-the buyers. Educators are fearful of being counted on the 
wrong side when looking for constituency support to maintain their service. When 
the society needed rapid agricultural development to stimulate economic growth 1 
the educators were on safe ground. Extension could be an end-of-the-line agency 
purveying the results of research to the users of new technology. Most research 
output was production technology 1 and Extension found this needed and popular. 
This process did not require much in program design because the research deci-
sions were made outside the Extension organization. Many still cling to this 
notion today. The administrator of the Federal Extension Service 1 as recently as 
April 1, 1961 1 in discussing Extension 1 s educational role 1 emphasized that 1 
"Extension is the only organization delegated to work side-by-side with Federal 
and State research agencies-with responsibility to interpret 1 translate 1 and 
disseminate the results of this research to the people. 2 
Thus Extension has been the link which translated research into increased 
agricultural production. However 1 the value to producers of additional produc-
tion capacity has been eroding away. In fact 1 the major income benefits of the 
educational and research effort have accrued more to the consumer than to the 
producers. These farm people are the ones the agricultural colleges look to for 
support, though they are becoming proportionately less influential in deciding 
I 
the public 1 s level of support for research and education. At the same time, non-
agricultural leaders seek research and education on problems of economic and 
social growth. The institution is not sure whom it ought to serve. 
With difficulty 1 land-grant institutions are establishing themselves as 
responsible to the objective interests of the society as a whole. Thus 1 we find 
the land-grant institutions in a state of transition 1 uncertainty 1 and confusion. 
The challenge and opportunity remains for the land-grant institutions to make an 
educational contribution to the whole of society in the areas of greatest need. 
Of particular need are solutions to problems which hang over both farmer and 
nonfarmer. With respect to bargaining power, land-grant institutions could 
identify and explain the basis of the conflict of interests. They could interpret 
the issues and make projections and forecasts of possible alternatives. For 
example I they could help co-ops I producer groups I commodity associations 1 
and marketing firms to better understand market demands I quality control I and 
consumer preferences. They could help consumers and agribusiness firms 
understand the nature of agricultural supply I components of costs of food I and 
the farm income situation. From such knowledge and through adaptation and 
compromise 1 they could reach a decision about increasing bargaining power and 
also about the volume 1 character, and quality of supplies and the level of in-
come for agriculture. 
2Address, E. T. York, Animal Health Institute, April 25 1 1961. 
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Estimate of Land-Grant College Readiness and ______ ...;;.. - -- - ......._ 
Capacity .1o Deal with Issues 
Let us look at several conditions that are essential to the success of gain-
ing bargaining power for producers. Keeping these in mind, we can then estimate 
the capacity of the land-grant colleges to help. 
1. Producers have to agree on who is to be the bargaining agent. 
2. The bargaining agent must also meet with the approval of the consumer. 
3 o The terms of trade (essentially price targets) have to be decided. How 
and by whom these are decided is also an issue. 
4. The use of excess resources must be decided, since their use influences 
economic wealth and growth. 
5. Black marketing must be avoided. 
These conditions show how essential is a fairly general public understanding 
if satisfactory decisions are to be achieved. It seems essential that the explana-
tion of such information as direct effects, side effects I long-run and short-run 
consequences 1 and implications of the bargaining power proposals be consistent 
from state to state. At present, there is no adequate system within the land-grant 
colleges for providing consistent intelligence to the several states. Neither 
is there such an organization outside the system. 
An example will serve to emphasize the difficulty of providing consistent, 
nationwide information. The Secretary of Agriculture feels that under the onmibus 
farm bill, "It would be the responsibility of the Secretary of Agriculture to con-
sider the 0 0 0 potential effects on our economy as a whole and the national wel:;i. 
fare. o. "3 (i.e., of farm program proposals.) It is doubtful that the same inter-
pretation would be made by some farm organizations or by workers, for example, 
in the land-grant colleges in the New England States. These states have a 
parochial view of agriculture, as do state-s in our area. They define their area as 
a deficit production area (not producing surpluses), and they favor low feed-grain 
prices. They believe such prices will- improve the competitive position of their 
broiler factories and dairy farms. Other areas also have views out of perspec-
tive with the industry as a whole. 
Conclusion 
The land-grant college system in the immediate future can make but a 
limited contribution to improvement in the understanding of society of the 
3 Address, Secretary Orville Lo Freeman, National Press Club, Washington, 
D. C . , April 1 7 , 19 61. 
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situation and alternatives in bargaining power. It will, therefore, not contri-
bute very much to the resolution of the issues on either side. 
These institutions are not in this position by choice. Some have made 
viable educational efforts and most have the desire to do so. What is lacking 
is a system for providing a consistent and constant stream of intelligence data, 
accurately interpreted in terms of the essential problems to which the society 
must respond. It is not likely that enough institutions will work together to get 
a large degree of national understanding. Without this clarity and total per-
spective it will be difficult to have effective educational program alternatives 
conceived, programmed, and carried out. 
Some work will be done, but its scope will be limited. Society may, in 
addition, acquire a measure of understanding from other sources, especially 
from commodity groups. This understanding may be biased in the direction of 
the self-interest of the commodity group leaders, but society has in the past 
moved to decisions with this kind of information. Whether these decisions are 
good or bad depends on your point of view. 
Summary 
The issues related to bargaining power are such that the interests of pro-
ducers and consumers are in conflict. For these conflicts to be reconciled in the 
national interest.,, the public and producer groups must understand the situation. 
Conceivably, the land-grant institutions could perform this educational function. 
To do so they would need additional research; even more important, the findings 
would have to be interpreted in terms of the ultimate goal--the general national 
welfare. But the land-grant college sxstem has no adequate internal mechanism 
for developing such interpretations. Nor does it, as the logical next step, have 
a process for developing alternative educational program systems to make a 
viable national educational effort. Therefore, it is not likely in the immediate 
future that an adequate and coordinated national educational effort :Will be 
mounted. The land-grant college system will not make its optimum contribution 
to the resolution of problems arising out of attempts of producer groups to gain 
bargaining power. 

FARMERS' BARGAINING POWER AND THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
by Ross B. Talbotl 
(Editor's note: In the following paper Dr. Talbot examines factors involved 
in efforts to increase farmers' bargaining power through legislation. The paper was 
prepared in May, 19 61, before final action was taken on the Agricultural Act of 
1961.) 
"All indications point to an acceleration in 1961 of a drive by farmers for 
more bargaining power. The reason is that this is earning power 1 and farmers 
will not be denied their right to it. " Homer L. Brinkley, executive vice president 
of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives I goes on in his annual report to 
say: "I want to emphasize that in the use of the term 'bargaining power' we refer 
not to any particular kind of cooperative but to the principle of matching the 
combined strength of farmers to the strength of those to whom they sell and from 
whom they buy. u2 
It has been this agreement on principle fused with a substantial disagree-
ment about the means to be used in its realization that has constantly plagued 
the farmer in his attempts to achieve bargaining power. For many decades the 
Iarmer has understood that power must be available to counteract power. 3 He 
has, at least, come to such an understanding during periods of low income. 
His inability to meet those who buy from and sell to him on equal or superior 
bargaining terms has brought about periods of frustration, calls to action 1 
occasional legislation, and -- in a few instances -- splurges of violence. 
A fad of today is to proclaim once again that lack of power is a fatal weak-
ness to the social, economic, and political position of the American farmer. The 
most notable and scholarly contribution in this field of disputation during the 
post-World War II era has been Galbraith's American Capitalism I in which he 
developed his concept of countervailing power and pointed sharply to the farmer's 
inability to exercise such power. A few years later _Willard Cochrane's Farm 
Prices: Myth or Reality provided intellectual respectability for a course of 
action 1 involving a specific approach to bargaining power which one of the major 
farm organizations had been advocating for several years. 
Theory and environment cameitogether during the 1950's: Farm income was 
on a rather constant decline (except for the Korean War period); the new 
phenomenon called vertical integration came into being; advancing farm costs 
1 Associate Professor of Government at Iowa State University. 
2National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1961 Blue Book, p. 5. 
3Fred A. Shannon, American Farmers Movem~ (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand 
Co . , Inc . , 19 57) , Anvil No . 2 8 . 
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kept widening the gap between the gross and net income of the farmer; the 
farmer consistently produced more than the market would bear at the price he 
wanted; and costs of farm programs started to mount. The climate was 
propitious for policical action. 
Political Approaches to Bargaining Power 
The leadership of the farm organizations, the political parties, and the 
Congress seem to be in general agreement that a critical weakness of the farmer 
is his lack of bargaining power. But, to use Walter Lippmann's apt phrase I we 
all have a different set of "pictures" in our minds of the nature of the reality that 
confronts us. It has been said that politics is a certain ordering of ideas I interests, 
institutions, and individuals. Probably so, but what kind of an arrangement of 
these four I' s do we have when we examine the bargaining power concept as it 
affects agriculture? The interaction seems to have produced a consensus about 
the nature of the problem but three divergent approaches to its solution. 
Bargaining power through the price system -- the Farm Bureau approach. In 
September 1959 I the board of directors of the American Farm Bureau Federation 
recommended that the AFBF establish a national farm marketing cooperative. This 
action was approved at the 1959 national convention; in February of the following 
year there was created the American Agricultural Marketing Association; by April 
1961, four state Farm Bureau marketing groups had become associated with the 
national organization. 4 All these moves were ostensibly designed to improve the 
economic power of the farmer. 
However I the Farm Bureau clearly intends to seek this bargaining power 
through what it considers the orderly and legitimate channels of the existing 
marketing system. " ... A 'sound 1 workable ' government program is agriculture's 
'Holy Grail' --- a phantom 1 will-of-the wisp that can never be attained because 
it replaces God-given economic processes with man-made political power I"' 
according to Charles Shuman. 5 
Just how effective the Farm Bureau approach will be in assisting farmers 
to obtain bargaining power, and thereby" ... the full market value of farm 
commodities," is an issue which will be pursued in a later paper. However 1 the 
impression should not be left that the Farm Bureau is unwilling to use the 
instrument of government at all in the pursuit of an improved farm income. For 
example, during the 86th Congress and now in the 87th, the Farm Bureau has 
been endeavoring to secure the enactment of an enlarged and extended land 
retirement program. The Farm Bureau drafted at least two bills in 1960 which 
were designed to advance the conservation reserve program, and in the 87th 
Congress it sponsored a "cropland adjustment" bill which would, among other 
things, place some 60 million acres in a land retirement program. 
4 The American Farm Bureau Federation 1 Official Newsletter 1 Feb, :2'2 I 
1960 and April 3 1 1961. 
5 Charles B. Shuman, "The Quest for the Holy Grail," Nation's Agriculture, 
June, 19 6 0. p. 6. 
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Bargaining power through social conflict -- the NFO approach. The National 
Farm Organization is pursuing bargaining power through a new form of the general 
strike which it refers to as a "holding action. " The objective and the strategy are 
obvious enough: Hold the particular commodity or commodities off the market 
until the processor agrees to a contract which will substantially increase the 
unit price of the commodity from what it was bringing in the "free market. " The 
technique is to organize most of the 500 "farm" counties into a "minute men" set-
up which can be used to shut off the flow of animals and grains to the market 
when the decision is made to do so. 
The NFO considers itself a nonpolitical organization; but by this is really 
meant bipartisan. 6 In NFO's opinion, the Capper-Volstead Act provides the legal 
justification for the holding action activity. NFO supported the feed grains bill 
(" ... it can improve our bargaining power immensely") and has come out in favor 
of the recently proposed Agricultural Act of 1961. Nevertheless, the NFO is re-
luctant to seek bargaining power through such political means: "We point out 1 
however, the weakness of relying entirely on legislation -- Congress can veto 
any plan developed by producers. Since consumers control Congress, consumers 
are still in a position to control farm prices. Are the prices charged by the U. S. 
Steel or General Motors, for instance, subject to congressional veto? "7 
Bargaining power through political conflict -- the Farmers Union approach. 
"Farm prices are made in Washington" has been a slogan of the National Farmers 
Union for .many years. Such a statement is to the Farmers Union an expression 
of reality, if not of preference. Farmers Union officials have denounced the 
Farm Bureau approach because, in their opinion, it is a. sure road to more 
production 1 lower prices I and the destruction of the family farm. The NFO 
approach had some attraction for them in the early 1930's when they assisted 
in the Farmer's Holiday movement I but the realities of American economic life 
and their own limitations in organizational strength have led them to pursue 
bargaining power through instruments provided by national· legislation. Since 
at least 1947 1 the Farmers Union has been advocating congressional action 
which would bring the farmer into a bargaining power situation which would be 
comparable to that of organized business and organiz·ed labor. 
These approaches make little, if any, original contribution to knowledge. Rather 1 
they give weight to Lord Keynes' contention that, " ... The ideas of economists 
and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong 1 are 
more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little 
else." 8 With time and diligence we might sketch the sources from which farm 
organizations derived their ideas. Such is not our task; for this presentation 
it will be sufficient if the approaches are described fairly accurately 1 without 
further questioning the why. 
6 TheNFOReporter, Feb. 1961, p.2. 7---
Ibid., April 19611 p. S. 
8 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest I and Money; 
this quotation therefrom is found in William Eben stein I Great Political Thinkers 
(New York: Rinehart and Co., 1951), p. 650. 
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~ and 86th Congresses and Farm Bargaining Power 
The pursuit of farmer bargaining power through the device of national legis-
lation is hardly novel. The Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 and the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 are two notable historical examples. However, 
the purpose of this brief section is not to develop a legislative history of this 
field but simply to provide background for discussion of the current political 
situations. 
There were several attempts during the 85th and 86th Congresses to delegate 
new or additional marketing order authority for the regulation of a specific 
commodity; in one bill an effort was made to clarify and amend the Capper-Volstead 
Act to add to the bargaining-power potential of cooperatives. The bills were not 
reported out of committee except the final version of the Poage bill (H. R. 12261) I 
which did receive favorable report but was defeated on the House floor. 
(1) S. 1680 (85th Congress -- First Session) would have permitted 
marketing orders for cranberries to be used for canning or freez;ing. 
Fresh cranberries are already covered by marketing orders. The 
farm organizations 1 including most of the grower's associations I 
favored the bill. The Department of Justice voiced serious 
objections 1 but the Department of Agriculture testified in the bill's 
behalf. It was not reported out of either the Senate or House 
committee. 
(2) S. 3864 (85th Congress -- Second Session) was entitled the 
National Turkey Marketing Act arrl would have permitted the 
issuance of turkey marketing orders. The USDA and the 
Farm Bureau had some serious objections to the bill. The 
National Grange actually drafted the bill; the Farmers Union 
approved 1 and many state turkey organizations strongly 
advocated passage. The bill was not reported out of committee. 
(3} H. R. 1077 and 14 other similar bills (85th Congress -- Second 
Session) were introduced to establish some form of dairy self-
help program. The USDA and the Farm Bureau opposed this 
legislation. Different versions of a self-help program were 
introduced but none was approved by either the House of 
Senate committee. 
(4) S. 2014 (86th Congress-- First Session) was designed to grant 
farmer marketing cooperatives complete immunity from antitrust 
laws I except where they combined or conspired with others. The 
USDA opposed the bill and recommended that no action be taken 
until the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision in 
the case of United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers 
Association. The Senate reported out the bill but later recalled it. 
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(5) H. R. 2490 (86th Congress -- First Session), the Metcalf bill, was a 
Farmers Union-sponsored bill. It would have given the Secretary of 
Agriculture and producer committees the authority to use nearly every 
known device to improve farm prices and incomes. The bill received 
no committee action. Then came the Family Farm Income Act of 1960 
(H. R. 10355), followed by the Family Farm Act of 1960 (H. R. ll769). 
The latter did come to a vote in committee, but all the Republicans and 
eight Democrats voted against it. Finally, there was the Farm Surplus 
Reduction Act of 1960 (H. R. 12261). It cleared the committee but 
was defeated in the House by a vote of 176-230. 
Congressman Poage, vice chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, 
introduced the last three bills, so they will be referred to hereafter as the Poage 
bills. 
Political Kaleidoscope 
Conflict is the essence of politics. "At the root of all politics is the 
universal language of conflict," and "democratic government is the greatest 
single instrument for the socialization of conflict in the American community. ,9 
When a particular course of action is believed to be one which will change the 
existing structure of social, political, and economic power, the issue will 
quite likely become involved in politics. Such is the situation today regarding 
the bargaining power of the American farmer. We are witnessing an all-out 
effort both to enact and to defeat the Agricultural Act of 19 61. Just the fact 
that the Farm Bureau has labelled the measure as "the Cochrane-Freeman bill" 
says a good deal about the nature of and the interests involved in the struggle 
for power. 
Of the three approaches outlined 1 it seems apparent that the third 
(Farmers Union) approach is the one that is now receiving its day in 
national politics. 
My guess is that H. R. 6400 10 will be enacted into law, although the 
Title I provisions may have to suffer at least one further important alteration: 
9 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and' Winston, 1960), pp~ and 13. 
10H. R. 6400 was introduced in the House by Chairman Cooley on April 18, 1961; 
S. 1643 was introduced in the Senate by Chairman Ellender on the same day. 
They are companion bills and are officially entitled the "Agricultural Act of 
1961". Hereafter I the bills will be referred to as H. R. 6400. In barest outline, 
the act contained the following provisions: 
Title I --Supply Adjustment and Price Stabilization programs: 
(1) Use of advisory committees; (2) Extension of marketing orders; 
(3) Use of marketing quotas; (4) Price stabilization authority --
direct payments, price support levels, etc.; (5) Congressional 
review. 
Title II --Extension of the Agricultural Trade Development Act (P. L. 480). 
Title III --Modification of the crediti program of the F arr'ners Home Administration. 
Title IV --General provisions concerning the Great Plains conservation program, 
the school lunch program, and the legal status of cooperatives. 
36 
The supply adjustment and price stabilization programs of the USDA and the farmer 
advisory groups will probably have to be submitted to Congress for whatever 
specific modifications the Congress, and notably its pertinent committees, may 
wish to extend. 
How could this prediction be plausible in light of the preceding review 
of recent congressional action and in view of the formidable authority which will 
be given to the USDA if H. R. 6400 becomes law? 
Please don't inquire into the laws of physics involved in a child's kaleido-
scope. For whatever the reason, a change in the structural positions of the glass 
particles brings about a new relationship of colors and imageries. In political 
terms, the equilibrium of power has been altered. Whether the viewer was more 
pleased with the original rather than the subsequent perspective is probably the 
crucial philosophical issue but not the one with which the political scientist is 
concerned. My contention is: The American voter turned the kaleidoscope last 
November. It was not a wrenching twist, mind you, but enough of a turn to 
bring one party into control of bDth the Presidency and the Congress. A few 
thousand votes in a few strategic states substantially changed the structure 
of political power. 
It would require a major effort to describe and analyze even the major 
causes and effects involved in the new kaleidoscopic formation, but an outline 
of at least the most significant political ingredients seems necessary. 
The Presidency. Since 19 33, the President has been the clear! y dominant 
figure in our American political system. Clinton Rossiter has named him the 
chief executive, the chief of state, the commander-in-chief, the chief diplomat, 
the manager of prosperity, the chief of his party, the chief legislator, the voice 
of the people, and the leader of a coalition of free nations. 11 Perhaps Herman 
Finer and Rexford Tugwell are correct in saying that no one man can wear so 
many "hats" without being crushed by an overburden of responsibility. 12 We 
are not about to change the system, however, so we must try to rna ke it work 
for the interests of the United States and all the free world. 
Our specific interest is farmer bargaining power and H. R. 6400. The picture 
in our kaleidoscope has changed: President Eisenhower was not about to accept 
a Poage bill, and the veto power is an almost absolute weapon. President 
Kennedy has sent just such a bill, and more, to, Congress. He can get it passed 
11 Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: The New American 
2 Library, A Signet Key Book No. Ks 334, 1956), Chap. I. 1 Herman A. Finer, The Presidency: Crisis and Regeneration (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1960}. 
Rexford Tugwell, The Ordeal of the Presidency (New York: Doubleday and Co., 
1960}. 
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if the priority is high enough on his agenda. A general farm bill is not top priority 
legislation in the President's judgment, but his political commitments in this area 
are rather formidable. 
The Congress. The critical period in the life of a bill is when it is in the 
committee stage of the legislative process. If the bill is reported out of committee 
the chances are about nine out of ten that it will pass at least one house of 
Congress. For whatever the reasons, neither Cooley nor Ellender would even 
introduce into the 86th Congress what we have referred to· as the Poage bills. In 
the 87th Congress, H. R. 6400 was introduced by Representative Cooley and the 
Senate companion bill (S. 1643) by Senator Ellender. The latter spoke on the floor 
of the Senate in favor of the Title I provisions: "The Congress would be able to 
carry out its authority and responsibility more effectively by devoting its attention 
to the broad policy questions and implications of recommended programs and not 
become involved in interminable discussion of the minute details involved. ul3 
Chairman Cooley talked to the House in equally enthusiastic phrases: "I have 
today introduced the Administration!'s Farm Bill. I shall do everything within my 
power to bring about its enactment at the earliest possible date. ul4 
Committee action poses certain imponderables. The Republicans gained 
21 seats in the 1960 House elections, and their membership on the House Agri-
culture Committee increased by two. The issue becomes: Will the Southern 
Democrats stand fast and vote for the ad mini strati on's bill? Probably some of 
' them will maintain their allegiance to the quondam coalition of Southern 
Democrats and Midwest Republicans. 15 On the Senate side, the two strongest 
advocates of potent national farm legislation of the H. R. 6400 variety have left 
the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry -- Senators Humphrey and Symington 
Their replacements -- Senators McCarthy and . Neuberger -- are of the same 
political inclinations as their predecessors but are not of equal experience and 
seniority. 
13 Congressional Record, Vol. 107, No. 65 (April 18, 1961), p. 5679. 
14 Statement by Congressman Harold D. Cooley, Chairman, House Committee 
on Agriculture , April 18, 19 61 (mimeograph) . 
15 This type of legislation tends to freeze production patterns. The average 
net income per farm family is considerably lower in the South than in the 
rest of the nation's farm areas ($2, 036 compared to $2,084 in 1959), but 
during the last decade it increased 16 per cent as contrasted to 4 per 
cent for the non-South. Change has been slow in parts of the South but 
"in other areas, where one-crop farming formerly was typical, peaches 
now blossom, cattle graze, hens cackle, and hogs bask in their parlors". 
(C. E. Bishop, "The Changing South - Problem or Opportunity, " Agri-
cultural Policy Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 fi 9 6 :Q. p. 4). 
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The same kinds of consideration must be _given. td the inter:play· 
of politj.cal forces that will take .place:-; when this bill moves to the floor of 
the House and the Senate. At this time a new variable enters --the urban 
members. The recession will probably be significant in keeping the Democrats 
in line, but the Republicans and the Farm Bureau, among others, will start to 
shout "bread tax" as soon as the bill leaves the committee, assuming the 
Title I provisions are retained. 
The Supreme Court. The Court has not used its power of judicial review 
since 1936 to void any Congressional legislation of an economic nature. The 
Warren Court is dominated, in numbers at least, by Eisenhower appointees, 
but the practice of judicial self-restraint in the area of economic policy is 
still being adhered to. 
Section 401 of Title IV in H. R. 6400 seems to countermand the Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. Virginia and Maryland Cooperative Associa-
tion (362: U.S. 458), but the qualifying phraseology is so general (" ... sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend tp create a monopoly"} that the 
Supreme Court will almost certainly have to give some interpretation to the 
statute. 
The U. S. Department of Agriculture. The U. S. Department of Agri-
culture is already, and by far, the most potent force in the formation and 
execution of farm legislation. If H. R. 6400 is enacted substantially as is, 
the department's role will become even more paramount. 
Here the changing picture seems clear. Secretary Benson strongly 
endorsed the Farm Bureau approach. Secretary Freeman is asking Congress to 
give him more power than any Secretary of Agriculture has ever had. Whether 
Freeman would use those powers aggressively is a point of conjecture, but 
there seems to be little reason to think that he would not. He is a dynamic, 
experienced, resourceful, and ambitious politician -administrator. To bargain 
effectively one must not only have power but, just as importantly, be willing 
to use it. 
The private interest groups. Any major political controversy leads to a 
coalition of public and private interests and ideologies. Sometimes these 
coalitions are multisided, but in the case of H. R. 6400 the situation is 
becoming one of the USDA-Farmers Union versus the congressional Republican 
leadership and the Farm Bureau. Both sides are engaged in the usual and hectic 
scramble for allies. The NFO approach is in temporary abeyance, and the NFO 
has chosen to side with the Farmers:·· Union for the time being. 
Certain of the farm organizations met at the National Grange headquarters 
on April 20 and agreed to support H. R. 6400. Eleven in all signified their 
alliance, among them the Farmers Union, the Grange, the National Association 
of Wheat Growers, the NFO, and the National Corn Growers Association. 16 
16 National Farmers Union, Washington Newsletter, April 21, 1961, p. l. 
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The American National Cattlemen Is Association has decided to ally itself 
with the Farm Bureau and announced that some of the sections of the bill form a 
breach of the traditional and consitutional rights of a free people ... 17 
At this juncture, the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, the National 
Milk Producers Federation, and the National Cotton Council have not committed 
themselves. 
The Farm Bureau has announced that the "Cochrane-Freeman" bill is "a 
bid to concentrate unprecedented power over the destiny of American agriculture 
in the hands of the Secretary of Agriculture and the Executive." 18 Secretary 
Freeman has testified that "delay or postponement (in the passage of this bill) 
now could mean disaster. The time is running out. l.l J.9 
Organized labor probably will support the Administration 1 s bill after it is 
reported out of committee. Organized business will surely rise to denounce the 
bill if it comes out of committee with the Title I features intact. 
The political parties and the constituency parties. The position of the 
national party organizations is fairly clear cut. The Democratic Party will 
certainly support the bill; the Republican headquarters will .:Pick and choose; 
that is, they will pick at Title I mercilessly and choose to accept at least 
Title II (the extension of the Public Law 480 program). 
The constituency parties are still the Democrats and Republicans, but 
their basis is provincial, not national. Each member of the House and Senate 
is, to a significant degree, on his own in American politics. The national 
party organization and the Congressional campaign committees may be of 
some financial help at election time, but largely, he -- the Representative or 
Senator -- will have to make his own decision about the configurations of 
power within his constituency. This condition probably will bring about some 
crossing of party lines when the bill comes up for floor votes. 
The "publics. " The urban consumer public will respond in some manner to 
the cry of "bread tax" and higher food costs. The processor, exporter, and grain 
storage publics will reflect on the meaning of a shrinking supply of farm products 
to their business enterprises. Those who believe in "cheap feed" will also ex-
press a concern. If the producers should vote down a supply adjustment program 
the defeat might harm the Kennedy Administration more than would the failure of 
the bill to be enacted into law. 
~ ~ The American Farm Bureau Federation, Official Newsletter, May l, 1961, p. 1. 
Ibid. 
19 Orville L. Freeman, Testimony QQ H. R. 6400, given before the House Committee 
on Agriculture, April 2 4, 19 61, p. 9 , (mimeograph) . 
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Albert Einstein was once asked 1 so the story goes I why Aristotle's studies 
of physics were outmoded while his writings in the area of politics were still 
considered highly useful. His generous reply was reported to be 1 "This is be-
cause politics is so much more difficult than physics. " It may well be true that 
this oft~told tale is the concoction of some frustrated political scientist. Never-
theless I the remark does point to one difficulty involved in political predictions I 
namely I the configurations in the kaleidoscope are never static. Groups and 
individuals are always in conflict when the issue at hand involves a change in 
the structure of power. 
This means that analyzing the various alternative courses of action is a 
rather pedantic way of viewing the political process. More specifically I power 
groups are seeking to bring all three approaches into constitutional 1 economic I 
and social reality. And the contests are going on simultaneously. 
The principal conclusion of this paper is as follows: Because of the 
present configurations ofpower 1 the USDA-Farmers Union approach will be the 
next legislative experiment to be put into operation in the area of farmer 
bargaining power. Let it be noted that this is only one estimate of the 
situation. 
BARGAINING POWER IN LABOR- MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
by Harold W. Daveyl 
The concept of bargaining power is treated here as it may be usefully 
applied in understanding the specific total relationship between Company X and 
Union Y, who are parties to a collective labor agreement. 2 Possible applications 
to the field of agriculture will be left to those more conversant with the latter 
field. The approach here is pragmatic rather than theoretical. 
The discussion is divided into three sections: (1) a brief survey of the 
legal framework within which contemporary collective bargaining takes place, 
(2) an analysis of some common misconceptions of the nature and content of 
bargaining power in the labor relations field, and (3) an outline of some con-
structive ways to use bargaining power concepts in management-union relations. 
Legal Framework of Collective Bargaining 
More than half a century ago Sidney and Beatrice Webb defined a trade 
union as a "continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of main-
taining or improving the conditions of their working lives. ,.3 This still 
accurately describes the basic purpose of most American trade unions. The 
principal union instrumentality for achieving this purpose since the time of 
Gompers has been collective bargaining with employers. 
1 Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. 
2 In speaking of Company X and Union Y, it is important to remember that the 
outstanding characteristic of union-management relationships· in the United 
States is their diversity and variety. There is no such thing as a typical 
or average company or union. American unionism is heterogeneous in size 
and structure, although reasonably homogenous (as will be noted presently} 
in its basic emphasis on collective bargaining as the principal instrumentality 
for achieving economic goals. .l\t this writing, there are nearly 2 00 national 
and international unions operating in the United States, to which are 
affiliated some 75,000 local unions. Approximately 125,000 collective-
bargaining contracts with employers are in force today. The union move-
ment embraces very small craft unions of a few thousand members as well 
as such sprawling giants as the Teamsters, who now claim 1, 700, 000 
members, and the Auto Workers and the Steelworkers, each with member-
ship in excess of 1, 000, 000. 
3 As quoted ih Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 3rd ed. 1959.,..---p:-29 
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The American union's philosophic orientation is normally as conservative 
as that of the typical American employer. This fact is not always easy for the 
employer to appreciate. American workers are not interested in having their 
unions assume control of industry 1 nor do they want their unions to have an 
official role in the -running of the business enterprise. They are interested in 
improving their own economic position and status in £particular job in .£. 
particular company in a particular industry. 
Unionism traveled a rocky road I legally speaking I until comparatively 
recent times. However 1 since the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act of 1932 1 
unionism as an institution has benefited from Federal statutory recognition that 
the "individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual 
liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor I and thereby to obtain 
acceptable terms and conditions of employment. " This implicit statutory 
presumption in favor of unionism and collective bargaining was made explicit 
in the Wagner Act of 1935 and continued in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 in 
the following language: 
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do 
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of 
contract I and employers who are organized in the corporate or 
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and 
affects the flow of commerce 1 and tends to aggravate recurrent 
business depressions 1 by depressing wage rates and the pur-
chasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the 
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions 
within and between industries. 
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of 
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards 
commerce from injury 1 impairment 1 or interruption 1 and 
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recogniz~d 
sources of industrial strife and unrest 1 by encouraging 
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial 
disputes arising out of differences as to wages 1 hours 1 or 
other working conditions 1 and by restoring equality of bargain-
ing power between employers and employees. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Taft-Hartley also recognizes that experience has demonstrated that "certain 
practices" of unions interfere with the effectuation of the "rights" guaranteed in 
the act and therefore must be eliminated. The act then states categorically I as 
did the Wagner Act I that it is the policy of the United States to encourage the 
practice and procedure of collective bargaining. 
At the same time it must be remembered that Taft-Hartley embraces a 
conflict of interests and goals. It attempts to protect both the right of workers 
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to form and join unions and to bargain collectively and their right to refrain from 
any and all such activities. Taft-Hartley also prohibits some of unionism• s 
historic instruments of economic pressure, notably secondary boycotts, strikes 
for closed shops, jurisdictional strikes, etc. 
Notwithstanding the severe legislative control by Taft-Hartley and, more 
recently, the addition of pervasive regulations of the internal affairs of unions 
under Landrum-Griffen (Labor-Managment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959), 
the basic policy of the Federal Government since 1935 has been to encourage 
the formation of unions and to encourage the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining. 
It is significant, however, that at no point has it been possible to give 
any substantive meaning to this legislative goal of equality of bargaining 
power. Achievement of such a goal may have been a plausible rationale on 
which to predicate the constitutional validity of the legislation in question 
(i.e. , the objective of removing hindrances to .. commerce. 11 ) Most students of 
labor relations, however, would agree that the concept and goal of equality 
of bargaining power has no real operational significance on an aggregative basis. 
It has meaning only in terms of specific bargaining relationships between particular 
companies and particular unions. Even on the microeconomic level, it would be 
naive to try to arrive at any precise quantitative estimates of relative equality 
or inequality of bargaining power. This brings me to the second area of analysis, 
an appraisal of some familiar misconceptions of the nature and content of bargain-
ing power in the labor relations field. 
Misconceptions about Bargaining Power 
Union not .£.monopolist. Economists writing about unionism and collec-
tive bargaining are partially to blame for the prevailing misunderstanding and 
misuse of the term bargaining power as it applies in the field of management 
union relations. Many economic theorists treat collective bargaining as a 
special case of bilateral monopoly in which the parties to the bargaining 
are concerned solely with wage determination. The union is treated as a single 
seller with complete control of the supply factor, the employer is regarded as 
sole buyer of this factor , and both are regarded as concerned only with the price 
of the factor. 
It is unrealistic to treat a union, when it negotiates, as a monopolistic 
seller in control of the total existing supply of the commodity in question. The 
only union that fits such an image is a craft union with closed shop contracts 
covering the total employment of a particular kind of labor in a particular factor 
market where the union in question is also .2... closed union. A closed shop held 
by a closed union does apprmdmate the picture of a monopolistic seller. How-
ever, the number of situations of this type is negligible today. Most craft 
unions 1 while they still seek closed shop contracts where legally permissible 1 
have abandoned closed union policies of a discriminatory nature and no longer 
engage in the cruder methods of supply restriction, makework, or technically 
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unauthorized strikes. Cape Canaveral is, in my judgment, an exception and 
not the rule. 
Industrial unions, whose membership is mainly semiskilled or unskilled, 
have no control over the supply of labor to the firm. Excepting some special 
situations such as longshoring, the industrial union has no control over 
hiring. The industrial union must seek to attain its job security objectives 
through seniority and union shbp provisions o plus limiting the employer's 
right to discipline to cases where good and just cause can be proved. 
To put the matter somewhat differently o the trade union is not a seller of 
labor in the way a business firm is the seller of a commodity. The trade union 
is an agency for the collective representation of particular groups of labor in 
particular situations. The union serves as the exclusive bargaining agent for 
employees in a defined unit of representation. Such a unit must be appropriate 
for bargaining purposes and one in which a majority of employees have signi-
fied their desire to have the union represent them. 
The concern of the union. Another common misconception derives from the 
average economist's conviction that the trade union is concerned only with 
maximizing something purely economic. Some economists assume that the union 
is out to achieve the highest possible money wage rate with little or no regard 
for the effect on volume of employment opportunities. Others assume that the 
union has the studied objective of maximizing total income to the membership. 
Such thinking assumes that the union operates within the same economic 
framework as business firms, who are presumed eager to maximize profits. 
Such analysis oversimplifies. It ignores the fundamental fact that unions by 
their very nature are not concerned with cost-price-quantity relationships in 
the same way or to the same degree as is the employer. 
The key to understanding trade union behavior lies in an appreciation of 
the proposition set forth some years ago by Arthur Ross of Berkeley that, "A 
trade union is a political agency operating in an economic environment. "4 As 
a political institution with an elected leadership, the union is under constant 
pressure from its members to deliver tangible gains or to appear to deliver 
tangible gains. Unions today still operate with the same pragmatic, nonideo-
logical orientation and objective of Sam Gompers -- "more, more, more --
now·." 
Union leaders are thus constantly preoccupied with the essentially political 
question of what and how much needs to be "delivered" to the membership at 
each successive contract negotiation to maintain membership loyalty. The 
leadership must cope continuously with such questions as what is equitable, 
what is obtainable, and what is acceptable. These are intensly practical 
4 Arthur M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1948), p. 3. 
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questions whose answers may or may not be consistent with the so-called pure 
economics of the situation. 
I do not say than union leadership does not generally have some fairly 
aggressive ideas on utilizing collective bargaining as a vehicle for maximizing 
membership welfare as seen by such leaders. I do say that analysis of union 
behavior based on an assumed effort at maximization in purely economic terms 
is likely to be partial and misleading in specific situations for two fundamental 
reasons: 
l) Such an analysis ignores the fact that to achieve the most for the 
welfare of its members in particular situations the union may have to 
trade economic demands for noneconomic ones. 
2) Or the union may have to insist on securing or maintaining an 
essentially noneconomic objective no matter what inducements might 
be offered to cause it to abandon such an objective. 
An illustration of the first point is the union which in facing an economi ... 
cally hard-pressed company reduces or abandons its economic demands in 
favor of securing some improved contract language (from the union~s standpoint) , 
dealing with seniority, promotional policy, and similar matters. The reverse 
of this is the familiar story of the union leader who brags that every year he 
"sells the union shop for a nickel." That is, a strong union makes a noisy 
show of demanding a union shop contract for the coming year; then it withdraws 
the demand as the employer offers to "sweeten" his wage offer by 5 cents. 
The second reason involves certain basicunion objectives in bargaining 
that are essentially non-economic and nonmeasurable in nature and which are 
not substitutable. That is, they will not be traded under any circumstances 
no matter how attractive the economic inducement to abandon them. An example 
of this is an employer offering an extremely attractive wage increase in 
exchange for an abandonment of contract language requiring the observance of 
seniority as the primary factor governing layoffs, recalls and promotions. No 
union could or would consider making this kind of a trade regardless of the 
economic calculus involved. Nor would any industrial union trade off contract 
language requiring that no employee be disciplined except for good and just 
cause. 
In short, the practical questions of what is equitable, what is obtainable, 
and what is acceptable in contemporary bargaining relate to both economic 
and noneconomic issues. 
Most trade unions do not serve a honogeneous constituency .. The.typical 
industrial or multi-industrial union, for example, embraces a highly hetero-
geneous conglomeration of conflicting interest groups whose diverse pressures 
on the leadership need to be blended and rationalized prior to and during 
negotiations and during contract administration. 
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The typical heterogeneity multiplies as the scope of bargaining extends 
beyond a single plant or enterprise into multi-employer or industry-wide 
bargaining. As Professor Fletcher emphasizes in his paper 1 the more compre-
hensive the alliance 1 the greater the potential gain in bargaining power. 
However 1 this very source of strength is also a source of weakness in that 
such alliances can be formed only by bargains among those who are potential 
participants. 5 The industrial union forcefully illustrates the validity of 
Professor Fletcher's proposition. 
Bargaining gains and losses. A third misconception arises because of 
many academic discussions tend to place too much stress on the word ''power" 
and not enough on the word "bargaining. " Such usl§.ge tends to support the 
familiar dichotomy of gain versus loss or pleasure versus pain which appears 
to dominate many discussions of this subject. Such an emphasis on power 
is certainly justified when applied to instances of what has been termed 
"collective bludgeoning" rather than collective bargaining 1 i.e., when the 
inequality in bargaining power has been so extreme that it sanctioned take-it 
or-leave-it bargaining by the union in some situations and by the employer in 
others. I respectfully suggest I however, that such situations are not 
representative of union-management relationships. I also suggest that the 
emphasis on a gain to X necessitating a corresponding loss to Y is not 
necessarily accurate. My experience supports the proposition that 2. sound 
bargain .!§. ~mutual! y acceptable bargain, resulting in some gains to all 
parties to that bargain. 
A so-called agreement that is in fact an .imposed ultimatum by X on Y or 
Yon X is not a bargain. It is an edict. Most collective bargaining relation-
ships, I submit, are not of this nature. On the contrary, the ultimate product 
of most negotiations is a written joint understanding that is mutually acceptable 
to the contracting parties and which contains advantages for each. 
Bargaining Power in Labor Management Relations 
I have elsewhere defined collective bargaining as a process in these 
words: 
... the negotiation, administration, interpretaion, application, and 
enforcement of written agreements between employers and unions repre-
senting their employees setting forth joint understandings as to policies 
and procedures governing wages 1 rates of pay, hours of work, and other 
conditions of employment. 6 
5 See L. B. Fletcher, "Concept and Importance of Bargaining Power I" 
Bargaining Power !p. Agriculture (this report) , p. _6_2_ 
6 Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining, (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 2nd ed., 1959), 1). 3. 
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This definition underlines the fact that collective bargaining must be 
viewed as embracing much more than contract negotiation. It must be seen as 
a continuous 1 dynamic process concerned with the total relationship involving 
the employer, the union, and the employees represented by the union. It is 
axiomatic that administration of collective labor agreements is of greater 
importance to the success or failure of the particular union-management 
relationship than contract negotiation. The process of continuous, joint 
consideration and adjustment of problems arising under the contract constitutes 
iii. many cases the real heart of the collective bargaining relationship. 
These adjustments are effected by the grievance and arbitration machinery 
provided for in the contract itself. Although many academicmns neglect con-
tract administration, it is of decisive importance. Yet, bargaining power 
considerations do not normally play a critical role in contract administration .. 
In fact, agreement by the two sides that arbitration shall be used as the 
last step in a grievance procedure means that they have jointly abandoned their 
relative bargaining strength as a means for reaching agreement. Under 
arbitration, authority is delegated .by contract to an outside party to make a 
final and binding decision on unresolved disputes arising under the contract. 
When companies and unions provide in their contracts for grievance arbitration, 
they are saying: "We hereby jointly agree to give up the right to use economic 
forces as the ultimate arbiter of disputes arising under our contract; instead 
we choose to accept as final and binding upon us the decision of an arbitrator 
on the meaning of our contract and its application to specific, unresolved 
disputes that may arise between us. " 
A responsible arbitrator does not make his decisions in terms of his 
estimate of the relative bargaining power of the parties. The arbitrator derives 
his authority from the contract. He is responsible to the contract rather than 
to the parties as such; he makes his decision in terms of this contract and the 
record made before him at the arbitration hearing. 7 
7Jt is worth noting that approximately 90 percent of the more than 125,000 
collective bargaining contracts now in effect in the United States provide for 
arbitration as the last step in the grievance procedure for finally resolving 
disputes arising under such contracts. The role of arbitration in contract 
administration is not well understood by many not immediately involved. For 
a more complete analysis see Harold W. Davey, rrThe Proper Uses of 
Arbitration," Vol. 9 Labor Law Journal (February, 1958), pp. 119-126. For an 
analytical treatment of arbitration in a particular management-union relation-
ship, see Harold W. Davey 1 '' The John Deere- UAW Permanent Arbitration 
System," in Jean T. McKelvey, editor, Critical Issues in Labor Arbitration 
(Washington: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.; 1957), pp. 161-192. 
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We also need to understand the limitations of the Hicks analysis of 
bargaining power. This analysis deals solely with the wage variable at the 
negotiation phase in developing its concepts of employer concession curves 
and union resistance curves; it thus regards strikes and lockouts as the 
result of a divergence of estimates; i.. e. , the union (overestimates the 
employer's capacity or willingness to concede, or the employer underestimates 
the union's capacity or willingness to resist. The Hicks analysis 8 is perhaps 
the best and most closely reasoned of the many efforts by theoretical econo-
mists to analyze bargaining power in a labor relations framework. However, 
like many other analysts, Hicks in my judgment misses the fundamental point 
that the concept of bargaining power has utility only if it is viewed, as Neil 
Chamberlain aptly suggests, "as an effective force behind the whole collective 
bargaining relationship and the process of intergroup agreement. .. "9 
Chamberlain makes the crucial point that bargaining power relates to the 
entire organized economic relationship between management and union. 
Bargaining power must be viewed from the point of view of all the conditions 
under which the cooperation of the economic partners takes place. It must 
be considered in terms of the costs of agreement relative to the cost of 
disagreement (using costs here in the broadest possible sense rather than in 
the purely economic or pecuniary sense). Bargaining power also must be 
regarded not only in relative terms, but as a dynamic, shifting phenomenon 
depending on the objectives sought. If it is to be meaningful, bargaining 
power analysis must consider the capacity of the parties to secure specific 
objectives. This point is well stated by Chamberlain in these words: 10 
The nature of the objective sought is determinative of bargaining 
power no less than is the bargaining skill or financial resources or 
membership strength of the organizations involved . The bargaining 
power of employer and union thus changes with the nature of the 
demands made. Their costs of agreement and disagreement are relative 
to specific objectives. 
Whenever Company X and Union Y negotiate for a new contract, each 
is engaged in the process of evaluating the costs of disagreeing relative to 
the costs of agreeing. They are doing so in terms of their respective 
specific objectives. Such a cost balancing operation, however, is not 
entirely or even primarily pecuniary. Rather it is an effort to appraise relative 
advantage and disadvantage when viewing a range of issues, some of which 
lend themselves to quantitative appraisal and many of which clearly do not. 
8 J. R. Hicks, Theory of Wages (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1932), 
Chapter 7. 
9 Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co. Inc., 1951), p. 220. 
1 0 Ibid . , p. 2 21 
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It is the very process of appraising nonmeasurable costs of agreement 
and disagreement that lends value and importance to the negotiation process. 
It is in that process that the company and the union jointly discover the 
feasible combinations that ultimately produce an agreement for the next 
contract period. If they do not discover such a combination, a strike or a 
lockout results. In this connection, one must remember that the basic function 
of a strike or a lockout is to produce agreement. Excluding the extreme case 
of one party seeking to smash or obliterate the other, the goal of economic 
force is the same as the goal of negotiations, i.e. , the reaching of a mutually 
acceptable agreement on wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other 
conditions of employment for a future period of time. 
Put in the simplest possible terms, C;lgreement between the parties occurs when 
the costs of agreement are equal to or less than the costs 6f disagreement,' In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, this goal is reached short of economic force. 
Summary 
In summary, a realistic conception of bargaining power in management-
union relations must, in my judgment, embrace the following considerations: 11 
1. Estimates of actual bargaining power must be made in terms of 
company X and Union Y, not in terms of such generalizations as "Unions 
are becoming too strong, " etc. 
2. Bargaining power must be regarded as taking into account the total 
situation--not only the striking br resistance capacities of the parties 
but also the entire range of economic, political, and social circum-
stances insofar as these may have a bearing on the costs of agreement 
or disagreement. 
3. Bargaining power must be regarded as a shifting matter in which 
even in a fairly brief period of time, substantial changes may occur 
in relative positions, e.g. , as a: result of politfcal pressures. 
4. For agreement to be reached, terms must be negotiated that for all 
parties concerned represent a cost of agreement equal to or less than a 
cost of disagreement. Disagreement may persist where the parties 
find that the terms under discussion make it cheaper to disagree than to 
agree. 
5. Bargaining power for any party may be increased by any variable or 
any proposal or any contemplated consequence that contributes to 
lowering the relative cost of agreement to that party or to raising to the 
other party the relative cost of disagreement. 
11 This summary closely parallels that of Neil Chamberlain, a perceptive 
recent writer on bargaining power. The reader should consult Chamberlain's 
Collective Bargaining, cited supra, pp. 213-238. 

BARGAINING POWER AND MONOPOLY IN INDUSTRIAL MARKETS IN 
RELATION TO SOME AGRICULTURAL POLICY PROPOSALS1 
by Howard H. Hines2 
As the decision to hold this series of seminars illustrates, both farm 
spokesmen and agricultural economists are interested in bargaining power and 
monopoly in the industrial sector of the American economy. There seem to be 
two reasons for their interest: Monopoly in industry might (1) justify measures 
to increase bargaining power of agriculture, and (2) exemplify techniques that 
agricultural markets might imitate. 
For either purpose, defining and measuring bargaining power and monopoly 
and discovering their prevalence in the industrial sector turn out to be much 
more complicated problems than they are often casually assumed to be. In 
the first place, the nonfarm economy, which we shall call the "industrial 
sector" for short, is extremely large--and diverse. Secondly, there are 
numerous dimensions to monopoly and competition and their measurement. 
Most of this paper is an attempt to make these matters clear. To do 
this, I shall explain a number of matters familiar to economists specializing in 
industrial organization including agricultural economists working in the area, 
but which I am told are perhaps not familiar to the larger number of agri-
cultural economists whose principal interests are elsewhere, or to those who 
are concerned with how these matters might relate to agricultural policy but 
who are not economists at all. As a guide to additional reading for those to 
whom the area is new, I am including fairly numerous footnotes. 
At the end I shall briefly consider how these findings relate to some 
kinds of agricultural policy proposals. 
Definition of Bargaining Power 
Despite the admirable efforts of Professor Fletcher and of others, I 
doubt that a rigorous definition of "bargaining power" is yet agreed upon by 
1 The original paper was read on May 18, 1961. Out of it grew a later 
manuscript most of which is substituted in this publication for the original. 
I have adopted a number of suggestions made by members of the seminar 
and by other readers. Professor Lehman Fletcher has been particularly 
helpful. The views, of course, are the author's. 
2 Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. 
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all participants in this seminar I still less by the general public. I am inclined 
to agree with Professor McKie of Vanderbilt University, who observes I "''Bar-
gaining power' is not a precise concept; the phrase is a way of expressing some 
conclusion about the totality of market structure. If we try to specify those 
factors which determine bargaining power, we find that we are merely enumer-
ating and describing all the structural elements of the market. "3 Since I 
believe that bargaining power derives from some kind of monopoly, and since 
there is a definite meaning for the latter term 1 I shall deal mostly with "monopoly" 
and avoid the vaguer concept. "Monopoly" means "control over the supply of a 
product to a market. "4 The results of monopoly may be undesirably high prices 
and profits 1 excessively low output, etc. The practical difficulties lie in 
defining "product" and "market," for if they are defined too narrowly, almost 
all firms would be monopolies, and if they are difined too broadly, none. 5 
Scope of the Industrial Sector 
Taken as a whole 1 the nonfarm private economy is both large and complex. 
Of the total national income I $417. 5 billion in 1960, only about 4 percent 
originated on farms. Exclusing this and income originating in government and 
the "rest of world" sectors I one notes that the industrial sector accounts for 
more than 80 percent of national income. This includes mining; contract 
construction; wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance 1 and real estate; 
transportation; communications and public utilities; services, and manufacturin9. 
Each of these categories is large and highly aggregated. (Only mining 
generated less income than agriculture.) As an example 1 consider manufacturin9 I 
the largest major sector. So heterogeneous is it that the Bureau of the Census 
has worked out an elaborate classification system which begins with 21 major 
industry (" 2-digit ") groupings (e.g. , food and kindred products I textile-mill 
3 James W. McKie, Tin Cans and Tin Plate: ~Study _Qf Competition in Two 
Related Markets (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1 1959) p. 24. 
This study of relationships between tin plate producers and tin can makers 
and between the latter and food processors should be compulsory reading 
for serious students of bargaining power. 
4 Contrary to one view encountered 1 this does not imply that every firm I even 
one selling in purely competitive market 1 has a monopoly. Such a firm 
controls the amount of its output 1 of course 1 but not the supply of the product 
to the market. 
5 Us~monopoly" and "monopolistic" as generic terms to cover not only 
control of market supply arising from concentration of output or sales in the 
hands of a single seller (as the etymo~ogy implies) but also that arising 
from oligopoly (few sellers) 1 and from the use of restrictive devices such as 
price agreements 1 market-sharing schemes, etc. These practices occur most 
often in markets where sellers are few 1 because there they can be made and 
enforced most easily. When they appear in markets where there are many 
sellers, it is usually with goverment sanction. 
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products, etc.) and runs down to more than a thousand product classes (" 5-
digit ") (e.g. , linoleum; warm air furnaces; mustard and other meat sauces, 
except tomato), and even to about 7, 000 products ( "7 -digit"). 6 
Furthermore, in analyzing monopoly, the appropriate focal point should 
be the market. The nonfarm economy includes not only manufacturers 1 markets, 
but also wholesalers I and retailers I. And each must be defined geographically. 
The total number of plumbing shops in the United States has little to do with 
the behavior of the few which operate in a neighborhood or small-town market. 
On the other hand, with modern transportation, interregional competition (even 
international, as automobile companies have found) may often be as significant 
as local monopoly once was. This 'paper, by the way, will discuss only 
markets for products, not those for capital and labor. It will not develop the 
important relationships between the two kinds--a serious omission. Even so, 
there are thousands of industrial markets. 
Moreover, as of January 1, 1961, there were 4 2/3 million operating 
business concerns in the United States--members of the various industries and 
participants in the thousands of product markets. 7 These include the giants 
that Fortune magazine lists in its annual "Directory of the 500 Largest U.S. 
Industrial Corporations" and its companion lists of the biggest commercial 
banks; merchandising, life-insurance, and transportation companies, and 
public-utility systems. 8 But millions of others are comparatively small; at 
6 See Maxwell R. Conklin and Harold T. Goldstein, "Census Principles of 
Industry and Product Classificantion, Manufacturing Industries," in Business 
Concentration and Price Policy, a conference of the Universities-National j 
Bureau Committee for Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1955). Also, the introduction to Concentration in American Industry, 
Report of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 85th Congress, 1st 
Session (Washington: -u-: s. G. P. 0 .. , 1957). 
7 Preliminary estimate. The number had grown by somewhat more than hper-
cent from a year earlier, a slightly smaller rise than in the more prosperous 
previous year. See U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business 
Economics, Survey of Current Business, June 1961, p. 5: 
All industries 
Contract Construction 
Manufacturing 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 
Services 
Other 
(Thousands) 
4,717 
479 
324 
323 
2, 011 
893 
687 
8 The latest list of Industrials is in the July 1961 issue, pp. 167-186. The 
other lists were published in August 1961, pp. 129-138. 
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any rate they are not giants 1 whether measured by sales 1 value added 1 as sets 1 
or number of employees. They 1 too I are part of the industrial sector. 
Whose Monopoly is Meant? 
Considering the enormous size of the industrial sector in America 1 one 
could give a competent report on monopoly within it in a paper of this length 
only if the nonagricultm:al industries and firms, though numerous 1 were 
reasonably homogeneous with respect to their monopolistic power. But there 
is an enormous variation in the degree of monopoly exercised in industry. 
One reason why this is not surprising is that monopoly and competition 
have a large number of dimensions. Almost every market outside of agriculture 
and some within contain a blend of monopolistic and competitive elements. 
But these do not combine in identical proportions. It is likely to be quite 
misleading 1 therefore I to calculate a total or average degree of monopoly for 
the entire nonagricultural sector. Ceratinly this gives a false impression 
unless one indicates that the dispersion around this average is as significant 
as the average itself. 
Even to represent a specific industry or market as mainly monopolistic 
or competitive may inaccurately suggest that every member firm possesses a 
uniformly strong or weak position. Yet the member firms of the vegetable 
industry range from such giants as Libby and Cal Pack to hundreds of anonymous 
strugglers-to-survive. 
Finally 1 when it comes to considerations of equity 1 what matters is not 
firms or farms but individual persons. For large companies this requires that 
we explore the problematical relationships between the monopolistic gains of 
the firms as such 1 and of the degree to which these gains may be shared with 
stockholders and employees. Stockholders may be numerous and may not all 
be rich. They may have acquired the stock long after the primary monopolistic 
position was established 1 perhaps at prices which capitalized the gains from 
it into rents retained by the original owners. The present stockholders may 
have acted "innocently," a view which if it were applied incautiously I might 
almost strip antitrust remedies of effectiveness. This is no hypothetical 
question I as everyone who has been following the DuPont-General Motors 
Case knows. Not only stockholders but also employees may in some circum-
stances share excessive monopoly gains. Whether these results come about 
because of unions is a matter of controversy, which we shall not attempt to 
explore. It is impossible to proceed 1 however 1 without remarking that unions, 
like firms I exist in varying degrees of strength and effectiveness. 
Those who refer to industrial monopoly or bargaining power 1 therefore I 
must state whose they mean. The steel manufacturers' ? Or retail shoe 
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sellers'? If monopoly of tin cans, American Can's or Heekin's? Or if it is 
an average, how weighted, and with what measures of dispersion? 9 
Dimensions of "Monopoly" 
Let us look at some of the dimensions of monopoly and competition. 
Probably we can fairly assume that the nomopolistic attributes of the industrial 
sector have been more fully presented by agricultural policy writers than the 
competitive aspects. On this supposition, the following discussion perhaps 
leans over backwards to focus attention on some of the more easily overlooked 
competitive elements. The purpose of this emphasis, I must state strongly, 
is not to ignore or condone the all-too- numerous monopolistic forces in our 
industrial markets. It is rather to attempt to achieve a balanced, factual 
picture in a specific context where one side seemingly has had stronger 
advocacy. 
We have briefly commented on the ::spatial aspect of market definition. 
The difficulty of defining "product" is that if it is taken too narrowly, almost 
all nonfarm firms would seem to be monopolies, and if too broadly, none. To 
illustrate, consider whether the Census Bureau's ''digit" categories suitably 
approximate the economic definition of product. For some purposes of "public 
policy, strict interpretation of product differentiation must be relaxed; yet 
this is no easy thing to do. Are 5- or 7-digit items too broad or too narrow 
in the light of crosselasticities of demand and supply? The point has often 
been analyzed theoretically10 and also in connection with the use of con-
centration statistics for the purpose of measuring monopoly. 11 For example, 
9 Perhaps the question may be asked, whose bargaining power is discussed in 
the other papers? The prospectus for this seminar series reads "farmers'"; 
also there are some corroborative references to ,'"'agriculture's. " But some 
of the discussion suggested that much of the time "a farmer's" bargaining 
power was meant. 
lOsee especially the work of Triffin, Papandreou, Bishop, and Chamberlin, 
cited in Edward Hastings Chamberlin, Towards ~ More General Theory of 
Value (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), Ch. 4 and Supplementary 
Note. 
11 The Senate report, previously cited. Also see: Clair Wilcox, -non· the 
Alleged Ubiquity of Oligopoly," American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, 40:67-73, May 1950; EdwardS. Mason, Economic Concentra-
tion and the Monopoly Problem (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1957), Ch. 1; and papers by Gideon Rosenbluth, Tibor Scitovsky, 
and John Perry Miller in Business Concentration and Price Policy, QQ.. cit. 
Closely related is George W. Stocking and Willard F. Mueller, ''The 
Cellophane Case and the New Competition," American Economic Review, 
45:29-63, March, 1955. 
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linoleum manufacturing is highly concentrated, but asphalt floor tile, another 
5-digit product class, is less so, and various carpet and rug categories, 
especially tufted carpets and rugs 1 except wool, still less. If all "floor 
coverings" were combined 1 the result would seem quite unconcentrated. (One 
must ascertain 1 however, the degree to which a s'ingl.e firm or a few of the s arne 
group of firms might dominate several of these categories.) Again, an apparently 
narrow category that is defined on the basis of business practices or technical 
considerations may actually lump together several distinguishable economic 
products, each monopolized. 12 
Nor can one automatically equate large firms with monopolists, or assume 
small ones to be purely competitive. 13 Absolute size (measured by as sets, 
sales, number of employees 1 etc.) and monopoly are not perfectly correlated. 
A chain of retail stores may be large absolutely without possessing significant 
power in any selling market nor necessarily in buying markets either. A small 
manufacturer may dominate a regional or specialty product market. The village 
general store in the days before automobiles and mail order houses was no 
giant business but it was nonetheless a monopoly. 
When it is observed that our largest 50 companies accounted, in fact, 
for 23 percent of the total value addeg by manufacture in 1954, and the 
largest 200 companies 1 37 percent, 1 it is evident that the relationships of 
these giants to our society and economy are among the most perplexing social 
challenges of the age. 15 Not all of these problems are monopoly problems, 
however, and neither all nonfarm business nor all monopolists are big. 
Price Formation for Industrial Goods 
Small or large 1 industrial firms typically operate quite differently from 
farm firms. Relatively few goods are sold on open markets; most prices in 
this sector are chosen or "administered" by the seller firms. Such firms 
usually have some opportunity for choice of price/quantity o(sales instead 
~; Chamberlin, op. cit. I Chs .. 4 and 5 ... 
Size and monopoly may be combined, of course. "Nevertheless 1 while it 
.'is size in combination with monopoly that constitutes one aspect--perhaps 
the most importal"'t"'aspect-~of economic concehtra'tior;tl it is advisable to keep 
'these elements separate in any analysis of the total problem of concentra-
tion." Mason, op. cit., p. 19. ii Senate suJ:>c.ornmittee ·report 1 (cited earlier .iri footnote 6) p. ll ,t table 1. 
On this subject, Edward S. Mason (editor), The Corporation in Modern 
Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959}, I is an 
interesting symposium. 
57 
16 
of being limited to quantity only, as is the case for farmers. Often they 
can follow a policy of price discrimination. 17 
I believe the best hypothesis is that the objective of the pricing 
procedures is to maximize long-run profits. Other investigators have suggested 
that something less than long-run profit maximization is frequently the 
business goal. 18 But even pricing to maximize long-run profits is always done 
under some degree of competitive constraints~ ~9-' 
The most common price-setting procedure is to identify the direct costs 
of the product and to add to this a markup to cover overhead and other indirect 
costs and a profit margin. For retail stores, the invoice cost is most of the 
direct cost o but for manufacturers, direct costs per unit are less easily dis-
cernible, and may significantly vary according to the rate of production. The 
amount to add per unit to cover overhead and common costs inevitably is 
16 
Economists naturally Will read the diagonal mark correctly as "or 1 " but there 
is some tendency among laymen to suppose demand is always perfectly 
inelastic to such firms, and sometimes to believe that it is costlessly 
expansible as well. 
17 Interpreted in a broad sense, to cover the use of different products, includ-
ing locational and time of sale variation, to achieve differential profit 
margins. The Robinson-Patman Act has inhibited some discrimination, 
especially between manufacturers and dealers. On the wide use of 
discrimination at retail, involving trade-ins 1 discount houses, and other 
devices, see Stanley C. Hollander, ''The 'One-Price' System, Fact or 
Fiction?" Journal of Retailing, 31: 127-44, Fall, 1955. 
18 The best review of the literature of business pricing practices is Richard B. 
Heflebower, "Full Costs, Cost Changes 1 and Prices 1 " in Business 
Concentration and Price Policy o op. cit. For later work see B. Fog I 
Industrial Pricifi9 :POITCies: An Al1"alySIS ·of Pricing Policies of Danish 
Manufactures (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1960). 
Also A. D. H. Kaplan, Joel B. Dirlam 1 and Robert F. Lanzillotti, Pricing in 
Big Business: A_ Case Approach (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 
1958) 1 and Lanzillotti, "Pricing Objectives in Large Companies)" American 
Economic Review, 48:921-40, December 1958 1 and ensuing discussion, 
49:669-687 I September 1959. 
19 And social, governmental or other "non-market" constraints, not discussed 
here but strongly urged by Jesse W. Markham, "Changing Structure of the 
American Economy: Its Implications for Performance of Industrial Markets," 
Journal of Farm Economics, 41:389-400, May 1959. 
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affected by rate of output. But the firm's rate of sales and production will 
depend on its price, for demand is never completely inelastic. It is there-
fore possible to set prices on the basis of "cost plus" only when it is 
recognized that demand determines the plus--and the cost r 
How elastic a firm's demand will be and the other characteristics of its 
long-run demand function will depend upon the alternatives available to buyers, 
The possibility of buying from other sellers of the same or nearly identical 
goods is the most powerful alternative if supplies of the other sellers are 
ample. Competition from "substitutes, " including alternative opportunities 
to spend money, also affects the demand for a single firm's product. (A 
consumer may buy a Fedders air conditioner or a Frigidaire I or take a longer 
vacation 1 or endure the heat while enjoying a new television set.) The firm 
can set any price it wlshes, but competition--direct and indirect--will control 
its sales. This and the potential competition from new entrants 2 0 into the 
field often (though not always) confine the choice of prices to a rather narrow 
range I not far removed from the level that might have arisen in pure com-
petition. 
Where goods are durable 1 another limit on the power of firms which 
sell new goods is the "overhang" of partially substitutable second-hand or 
scrap products. This has affected markets for low-priced automobiles, farm 
machinery, shoe machinery, vacuum cleaners, housing, and aluminum, to cite 
a few examples. 21 The problem is not unlike that ~f "surplus" stocks in 
wheat and other storable agricultural commodities. 2 
2 0 The ability of the chain stores and other large retailers to enter or threaten 
to enter manufacturing and other possibilities for vertical integration are 
tremendously important. Where, as is usual, these retailers I though large, 
are nevertheless subject to relatively intense competition in their reselling 
markets, the lower prices they receive are probably reflected in lower 
prices to the general public. (It is impossible here to consider the effects 
of the Robinson-Patman Act; it seems to have encouraged retailer entry into 
manufacturing.) See M.A. Adelman, A & P: A Study in Price-cost Behavior 
and Public Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959) 1 especially 
ZI Ch. 12. 
For example I see U. S. v. Aluminum Co. of America 1 148 F. 2nd 416 (1945) 1 
which examines the question of competition from scrap. Also, Carl Kaysen, 
United States ~ United Shoe Machinery Corporation (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1956) 1 p. 73. 
22 Incidentally 1 this shows the fallacy of the popular view that sellers of 
"perishable" goods (and services) are at a bargaining disadvantage. Were 
the goods just named perishable, monopoly today would be strengthened. 
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Price and Output Flexibility 
How responsive are these industrial prices to changes in costs or to 
secular or cyclical changes in demand? 2 3 Compared with prices in the organized 
commodity and financial markets, they are relatively rigid. But it is easy to 
exaggerate this point. When one looks carefully at the facts, there often turns 
out to be more price flexibility than surface appearances suggest. Consider 
some cases where demand falls. Official or openly-quoted prices may be 
fixed, but sales may take place "off list. " Or prices for a line of products 
may remain constant, but the proportion of sales shifts from mostly "deluxe" 
to mostly "stripped" models. In some respects, this can be viewed as a form 
of price competition, Or credit is extended more generously than usual, or 
delivery terms, return privileges, and guarantees are liberalized. 
In the summer of 1961, industrial prices were generally stable. Yet some 
were rising (textiles, ball bearings, aluminum conduits), and others were 
falling. The dropping prices were conspicuous since a general business upturn 
had been widely expected. Price cutting was stimulated by foreign competition 
and substitute materials in the case of specialty steel items, by new produc-
tion techniques and "competition'' in electronic semiconductors, by over-
capacity and "a desire to be more competitive so as to forestall more price-
fixing suits" in machinery and tools. 24 Usually overcapacity in relation to 
demand is a cause of price cutting. Its pressure on prices may be resisted in 
short, mild cycles. But history shows that there is a different response to 
prolonged weakness of demand, especially secular declines. In its face, 
sellers may call for government help. They may attempt to fix prices on their 
own. (Overcapacity was a factor in the recent electrical equipment conspiracy.) 
They may try to switch to other products or markets. 25 But price cuts usually 
come first in these circumstances. 26 
Nonprice Strategies Available to Industrial Firms 
-- ----
Firms outside agriculture have not only a range of choice in pricing but 
also in other business strategies. Most of these firms sell a large variety of 
2 3 Richard Ruggles, "The Nature of Price Flexibility and the Determinants of 
Relative Price Changes in the Economy," in Business Concentration and 
Price Policy, op. cit. , is an important contribution and conveniently cites 
the earlier literature. Also see The Relationship of Prices to Economic 
Stability and Growth, compendium of papers submitted by panelists appearing 
before the Joint Economic Committee, 85th Congress, 2nd Session (Washing-
24 ton: U.S.G.P.O., 1958). 
Business Week, July 1, 1961, pp. 17-18. For many other instances see Wall 
Street Journal (Midwest Edition), July 19, 1961, p, 1. 
25 Business Week, "The Big Switch From Aircraft," April 8, 1961. 
26 Often specific plants have been bought, run into losses and ev.en bankruptcy, 
sold at knock-down prices to new owners, who then could merely return to the 
cycle. "What is needed to eliminate excess capacity is not the extinction of 
firms but the sterilization or scrapping of capacity 1 and competition in selling 
(price-cutting) is much less effective in killing capacity than firms. " Jack Downie 1 
The Competitive Process (London: Duckworth, 1958Y., pp. 117-8. 
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products. I have seen an estimate, now probably outdated, of 2, 000 different 
product items for General Electric, 350 for Armstrong Cork, and 32 1 000 for 
B. F. Goodrich. The modern supermarket carries 6,000 or more items. And 
who could count those in a typical "drug" store? The number and selection of 
products can often be profitably varied. For instance, not only can the super-
market add bli substitute new brands of food 1 but it can stock drug or hardware 
items. Manufacturers can vary the design, size, flavor 1 color, packaging I 
etc., of individual products; retailers can modify the conditions under which 
products are sold (the location and environment of the store, the terms of 
deli very and payment, the nature of guarantees 1 etc.) Where one firm can 
distinguish its products from those of others (by design, location, trademark I 
or otherwise) 1 it may profitably use sales promotion I including advertising, 
as part of the "marketing mix." A manufacturer will be able to choose among 
many options about marketing channels. For example, he may use independent 
wholesalers or he may be his own distributor; he may try for dense distribution 
of his product or he may elect to use a smaller number of exclusive sellers. 
Innovational strategies include not only the development otfew product 
varieties, but also new techniques of production and marketing. 
Even allowing that every one of these kinds of strategies is not always 
open to every industrial firm 1 one cannot doubt that the opportunities of 
industrial firms typically are more numerous than those of farm firms. The 
question is, "Does this indicate posession of significant bargainipg advantage 
or monopoly?" 
It may. It often does. But it does not always. The business firm can 
choose from many lines of action 1 but so can his rivals. The concentration of 
output or sales of a product into a few hands does not really indicate much 
monopoly power if it would be easy for additional sellers to enter that market. 
This is just what happens when an established manufacturer or retailer adds 
to his line a product which has been doing well for others. Entrants and 
potential ~entrants need not be newly-established firms. They may be already-
established firms, perhaps quite large ones, who take on another product or 
market. Thts is the competitive side of the "conglomerate •• firm arrl of much 
vertical integration. Supermarkets begin to sell aspirin and toothpaste; 
automobile companies begin to manufacture t!i.res; vegetable canners make their 
27 The cause and effect relationships between monopoly and research and 
innovation are much disputed. For the latest installment in the controversy, 
see James S. Worley, "Industrial Research and the New Competition," 
Journal of Political Economy, 49:183-6, April 1961. 
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. 28 
own tin cans; A. & P. bakes 1ts own bread. A farmer cannot enter many of 
these markets, of course, but groups of farmers can and have by means of 
cooperatives. 
It is a mistake to suppose that business firms which somehow manage to 
lessen price competition always thus assure themselves of comfortable and 
effortless profits at the expense of their customers or suppliers. Frequently 
it is as hard for a businessman to earn profits or even to survive when con-
fronted by nonprice competition as when faced by price competition. Moreover, 
nonprice competition is extremely varied. Precisely for that reason it is 
usually harder to avoid nonprice competition (even with government assistance) 
than to suppress price competition. 
Profit and Survival Results 
Variety in business situations is reflected for illustration, in the 
performances of vq.rious firms reported in the Brookings Institution study of 
giant businesses. 29 Pricing methods and pricing results varied among 
companies, among products within the same firm, and over time. The study 
reported General Motors 1 income after taxes as a percentage of capital in-
vested was never below 17.03 percent from 1947 to 1955, and in two of those 
years, it was more than 30 percent--after taxes. Nor were automobile workers 
nor Chevrolet dealers visibly squeezed in the period. The study does not 
report the fates of Kaiser, Packard, and other auto companies. But in contrast 
with the performance of General Motors, Swift and Company in the same period 
only once made 10 percent (10. 74, after taxes, in 1953). It usually earned 6 
or 7 percent, but in 1951 returned only 3.55 on capital invested. The varia-
tion in return by the different products of all of these multiproduct firms must 
have been extraordinarily large. One can infer this from the unwillingness of 
firms to publish profit data product by product. 
Similarily, Fortune magazine Is survey illustrates a variety of profit 
results among the 500 largest industrial firms in 1960. The 10 most profitable 
firms made from 22.2 to 43.4 percent on invested capital; but among the 500 
28 The ability of chain stores or other large retailers to enter, or threaten to 
enter, manufacturing is tremendously important. Where, as is usual, these 
retailers, though large, are nevertheless subject to intense competition in 
their reselling markets, the lower prices they can thus obtain probably 
result in lower prices to the ultimate consumers. See Adelman, op. cit., 
especially Ch. 12. Adelman also considers the effects of the Robinson-
Patman Act, which seems to have encouraged retailer entry into manu-
facturing. 
29 Kaplan, et. al., op. cit. 
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giants,, there were 24 which lost money. The 1960 median return for firms in 
the 50 0 class only, but grouped by industry, ranged from ll. 7 percent in 
tobacco to 6. 1 percent in metal products. For all industry ,9. 1 percent was the 
median. 
Evidence of the fate of an unhappier group drawn this time from firms of 
all sizes in commercial service, construction, manufacturing and mining, and 
retail and wholesale trade-- is reported by Dun and Bradstreet. This firm's 
data show that annual failure rates, seasonally adjusted, have rarely fallen 
below 50 per 10, 000 concerns during any month within the past three years. 30 
Social Desirability of Nonprice Strategies 
But is nonprice competition socially desirable? This is a most difficult 
question. 31 Changing the size of a candy bar but leaving its price fixed at 
the conventional price of 5 or 1 0 cents presents no challenge. But what can 
we say about altering its flavor? Some persons would be delighted, others 
disappointed and still others quite unaware of the change. In general, con-
sumers seem to want a wide variety of designs and models from which to 
choose. Indeed, people criticize excessive standardization of American 
consumer goods quite as mften as tl}ey attack multip1iCity and change.. They 
welcome moderately frequent changes, too, for vari.ety if not always for 
"functional" reasons. On the other hand 1 many hold that the near-annual 
cycle in automobile models is unreasonably costly--especially in a product so 
mature as this one. (In early days 1 I have been told, the annual model was a 
device for slowing the rate of model change. ) The social benefit and harm 
from advertising and other selling efforts are probably the most difficult of 
all to ascertain. 32 
30 Published monthly in U. S. Department of Commerce 1 Survey of Current 
Business, e.g. , June 1961, p. S-5 I when the rate was 64. 3 for May. 
31 One student offers this hypothesis: "Price competition is more likely to 
lead to workable competition than nonprice competition. This is one of the 
most important theoretical issues in the field of industrial organization 
and price policy, and one upon which there is no general agreement. " 
(Emphasis supplied.) Thomas A. Petit 1 "Th~alue of Competition: A 
Study of the American Softwood Plywood Industry," Journal of Industrial 
Economics 6:46, October 1957. Also: " ... the important inference to be 
drawn from the theories of oligopoly and monopolistic competition is not 
that the typical firm ... competes less, or more, than it would under condi-
tions of pure competition, but that it competes differently. " Jesse W. 
Markham, loc. cit., pp. 390-1. 
32 The standard work, but by no means the ultimate word on the subject, is 
Neil H. Borden, The Economic Effects of Advertising (Chicago: Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1942). 
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Informed judgments about the total outcome of price and nonprice 
competition in specific markets appear in the: many excellent industry studies 
that have been published (some of which are cited in this paper) 0 At least for 
now, however, generalizations about the social worth of nonprice competition 
are impossible to make on a scientific basis 0 From the point of view of the 
business firm, nevertheless, competition in any form makes life difficult and 
profits scarce 0 Which point of view is relevant to the use of industrial 
competition information in the farm policy debate? 
Some Attempts to Measure Monopoly Structures in U 0 S 0 
As we have mentioned, some of the forces that constrain a business firm 
as it seeks to attain maximum profits may originate within the organizational 
structure of the firm itself, especially if it is a large firm; or they may stem 
from the ethical and moral climate of the community and the possibility of 
political sanctions against certain kintl.s of behavior 0 It is not possible 
here to do much more than mention these fascinating but difficult matters 0 We 
have to limit ourselves to the economic constraints from outside the firm, 3 
especially those caused by what we shall call the structure of the industry 0 3 
These include (1) competition of other firms selling identical or similar 
products in the same markets, (2) the effects of generalized competition from 
sellers of products outside the particular industry, (3) the role of large buyers, 
(4) the significance of durable products, and (5) the effectiveness of entry 
and potential entry 0 
Two kinds of factors might prevent an industry from exerting strong 
competitive pressures--price or nonprice--on its member firms 0 (1) There 
may be cartels or other overt monopolistic agreements and practices--these are 
protean--which!· restrain competition among firms 0 (2) The structure of the 
industry may be so concentrated that aggressive competition is avoided merely 
by recognition of mutual dependence among member firms 0 34 
33 For the meaning of "structure of industry," see Joe So Bain, "Price and Pro-
duction Policies, " in Howard S 0 Ellis, editor, A Survey of Contemporary 
Economics, (Vol.l) (Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1948); and Bain, Industrial 
Organization (New York: Wiley, 1959) 0 
34 For a while, economists were coming to think formal agreements in these 
oligopolistic markets were obsolete o This was before the electrical equip-
ment conspiracy was disclosed 0 
Already in 1948, Bain had observed (in the Ellis Survey, Po 158)," 
In the first flush of enchantment with the new price theory lof oligopoli} , 
and of reaction against the old 'trust problem' study, there may have been 
some tendency to discount the importance of collusion. It may have been 
supposed that the theory of oligopoly pricing showed collusion to be 
unessential--'mutually recognized interdependence' taking its place or 
giving the same result--or that emphasis on the firm's demand curve 
eliminated the necessity of direct reference to crass institutional matters. 0 0 0 
The suggestions of IJ:'hurmanJ Arnold and [Qorwin D] Edwards were thus 
(continued on next page) 
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Obviously, the number and relative size of business firms in each 
market are crucial, although they are not the only factors. Two eminent 
students of competition and monopoly have distinguished between structural 
oligopolies. They call Type One those in which the first 8 firms have at least 
50 percent of total market sales, and the first 20 have at least 75 percent. In 
Type Two the first 8 firms share 33 percent of the market, and the rest of the 
market is relatively unconcentrated. Of Type one, they say: 
Recognition of interdependence by the leading firms is extremely 
likely, and the 7 5 percent share of the first twenty sellers makes 
it likely that the response of the smaller sellers will not limit 
the behavior of the larger firms. 35 
The same investigators have attempted to c:iassify American manufacturing 
industries by careful analysis of the concentration data originally published 
by the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 36 It would be too technical for the present purpose to describe 
how they divided or combined the "4-digit" product class groups, considered 
the significance of imports and of regional submarkets, and otherwise attempted 
to convert the "digits" into meaningful economic industry markets. 37 However, 
let us refer to their conclusions, for I think they are as close as we can get 
to tenable generalizations. For national-market manufacturing, they find: 
34 (continued) useful in reminding us: (1) that collusion in some sense often 
if not commonly plays a strategic role in the process of price formation; 
(2) that it is a very complex phenomenon, and can assume many significantly 
different forms; (3) that price behavior may vary with the sort of collusion 
adopted, and with the state of law and law enforcement affecting collusion .. " 
For an amazing accou:b.t:;6f General :Electric's part in the electrical 
35 equipment conspiracy, see Fortune, April, May 1961. 
Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and 
Legal Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 27. 
36 The data source is cited in a preceding footnote. The importance of this 
source, compared with direct use of the Census of Manufactures, is that 
the Census reports on the basis of establishments, whereas the Committee 
was able to have the 1954 Census data reworked by the Bureau of the 
Census in terms of firms. Several establishments might be controlled by a 
single firm. 
37 An essential critical review of the literature on definition and measurement 
of both concentration -and monopoly (they are not synonyms) is Edward S. 
Mason, Economic Concentration ... , op. cit., Ch. 1. Also see papers by 
Rosenblutl), Scitovsky, and Miller, in BuSTri"ess Concentration and Price 
P6licy, ..2.2... cit . 
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The manufacturing sector contains a numerical preponderance 
of structurally oligopolistic markets ... which, because of its 
location in the economic process, has a special importance 
in the functioning of the American economy. At the same time, 
this one market type hardly dominated manufacturing, since 
there is a substantial minority of unconcentrated industries. 38 
Some markets are more important than others. The value of shipments is 
a rough indicator of economic importance, and Kaysen and Turner use this 
measure. However they also emphasize the location of the industry in the 
economic process. That is, monopoly in industrial input materials used in 
several industries, such as steel, and investment goods in general is much 
more important than in consumer nondurables. 39 
The mineral industries are smaller even than agriculture, out:theirproducts 
are· pervasive and important industrial inputs_. _The same inV~stigators fdund 
many (but not all) of these to be concentrated. The three largest copper 
companies account for 60 percent, and the 19 largest for 99 percent of 
domestic copper output. Moreover, the imports come mostly from Chile, 
where the same three companies own almost all production. Many of the giant 
3 8 Kay sen and Turner, op. cit. , p. 3 6. The pattern of market structures in 
regional manufacturing industries is approximately the same. Seep. 37. 
39 Something of what they have in mind might be seen in the analysis of Otto 
Eckstein and Gary Fromm for the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 
1959, which used Leontief's input-output technique. They found, "If steel 
prices had behaved like other industrial prices, the total wholesale price 
index would have risen by 40 percent less over the last decade and less 
by 52 percent since 1953. Finished-goods prices would have risen less by 
23 and 38 percent,. respectively." Study Paper No. 2, Steel and the Post-
war Inflation, Study of Employment, Growth and Price Levels; Joint 
Economic Committee, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: U.S. G. P. 0. , 
November 6, 1959). 
Not only do the prices of such products affect a multitude of other prices, 
but they also cause the production methods and product designs of other in-
dustries to be altered .in order to minimfze the use of such inputs. The rising 
relative price of steel, together with the growth in the number of firms and 
in capacity in the aluminum industry, has brought the aluminum automobile 
engine into production. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the industries 
with lowest concentration are in consumer nondurables, the least important 
products by these tests. 
On steel prices, also see the very provocative "Steel, Administered 
Prices and Inflation," by M.A. Adelman, Quarterly Journal~ Economics, 
Vol. 75, (February 1961), pp. 16-40. The behavior of the steel industry, 
far from typifying "industrial" behavior, is clear! y extreme. 
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mineral producers operate in several markets, so cross~product competition 
is weakened. Thus, Anaconda is one of the largest copper, silver, lead, and 
zinc producers~ Phelps Dodge is important in all these and in gold as well. 
Bituminous coal, however, is not very concentrated. 
In trade, service, and construction, markets are usually local. Indeed, 
they may be neighborhood; the problem of defining markets here is very 
difficult. The number of sellers in each market is, therefore, far fewer than 
one might expeer considering the enormous total number of firms of these 
types which operate in the nation. Nevertheless, "the traditional view that 
the local-market industries are essentially competitive in character is 
probably correct .... "40 
Dynamic Competition 
The structural approach to measurement of monopoly, we see, need not 
be limited to observation of the present membership of narrowly-defined 
markets. Properly done, this approach can take account of competition from 
imports, from "substitutes" and alternative ways of spending money generally, 
from entry and potential entry into the markets, and from the possible offsetting 
influences of such large buyers as chain stores. 41 It perhaps runs the danger 
of giving insufficient weight to the effects of rapid technological advance and 
its economic results. The strongest proponent of competition in the form of 
new products and new methods of production was, of course, the late Professor 
Joseph Schumpeter. His brilliant defense of capitalism as the dynamic process 
of "creative destruction" asserts that the kind of competition which really 
counts is: 
... the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, 
the new source of supply, the new type of organization ... --
competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage 
and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the out-
puts of the existing firms but at their foundations and their 
very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective 
than the other as a bombardment is in comparison with forcing' a 
4° Kaysen and Turner, ...QE_. cit., p. 40. They qualify the statement in several 
ways, particularly noting the many cartel-or guild-like restrictions in this 
area, enforced by trade associations, unions, and local governmenits. 
41 For further consideration of these factors favorable to competition, see 
R. B. Heflebower, "Monopoly and Competition in the United States of 
America," in Monopoly and Competition and Their Regulation, papers and 
proceedings of a conference held by the International Economic Association, 
edited by Edward H. Chamberlin, ((r.ondon: Macmillan, 1954). 
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door, and so much more important that it becomes a matter of 
comparative indifference whether competition in the ordinary 
sense functions more or less promptly; the powerful lever that 
in the long run expands output and brings down prices is in any 
case made of other stuff. 42 
No matter how 11 static II one's thinking about the monopoly problem may 
have been before reading Schumpeter, it will never again be possible to forget 
the role of innovations. It would seem, however, that competition in this 
form is a great deal more active in some markets than in others. Also, 
Schumpeter himself had a rather timeless, historical kind of mind which was 
satisfied to view the world in terms of trends that could work themselves out 
only over a half-century or more. Whether the average American citizen and 
consumer has this patience is doubtful. 
~xtent of Monopoly and Competition in Industry 
Both the fate of the individual business firm and the social results of 
business performance depend upon the degree of monopoly and competition in 
a market. There is extensive literature on methods of measuring market 
power in terms of (1) market structure--in such dimensions as number and 
relative size of firms, degree of vertical integration, etc. ; (2) performance--
relation of prices to costs, level of costs, rate of innovation, etc.; and 
perhaps (3) market conduct-- especially devices for coordinating decisions 
among sellers. 
42 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, (New 
York: Harper, 2nd edition. 1947), pp. 84-85. See generally Chs. 7 and 8. 
He further argues that some degree of absence of competition at each point 
of time may be a condition for the speed of long-run performance. This 
point is echoed in John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 96: 
The showpieces (of American industrial achievement) are, with rare 
exceptions, the industries which are dominated by a handful of large 
firms. The foreign visitor, brought to the United States by the Economic 
Cooperation Administration, visits the same firms as do attorneys of the 
Department of Justice in their search for monopoly. There are innumerable 
critics, however. See James S. Worley,loc. cit. 
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The best advice is to use a combination of these measures. 43 This 
technique has been applied--a painstaking operation--to a number of American 
industries recently. 44 Owing to the difficulties of obtaining information about 
private business~s, most investigators have had to rely upon data obtained 
from large-scale antitrust cases or other government activity. As a result, 
the studies are biased toward industries that present major monopoly problems 
(aluminum, in past years I or motion pictures) or, occasionally, those which 
suffer acutely from excess capacity and perhaps excess competition (bitumi-
nous coal). 45 With this bias noted I what generalizations could one make 
from these individual industry studies about markets and businesses in the 
industrial sector as a whole? Only the following 1 I hazard: 
(1) There are a great many monopolistic forces in American industry--
more than we need, more than we should continue to condone. 
(2) There are also a great many competitive factors--more than critics 
of business usually recognize. 
Again we may observe that the relative positions of different firms within 
industries and markets are, of course, also diverse. 
Capacity Adjustment 
Before closing I I should also make a few remarks about cyclical and 
secular (or long-run) capacity adjustments in industrial markets. The 
organizers of the seminars have specifically requested this. However, 
considering the context, I cannot see how the cyclical question is relevant, 
for today the agricultural problem is essentially long run rather than cyclical. 
In addition, the industrial products for which cyclical fluctuations are 
greatest are capital goods and durable consumer goods. Thus behavior is 
affected obviously and substantially by differences in kind of product and 
not by industrial organization and degrees of monopoly. In passing I I shall 
report, however, that I am not aware of any considerable body of economic 
thought which any longer holds that flexible prices in industrial markets 
would cure the cyclical production-employment problem. 46 
43 Much of the literature is concerned with matters of law as well as economics, 
with which alone we are presently concerned. Key works are: Mason, 
Economic Concentration ... ; Bain, Industrial Organization; and Kaysen and 
44 Turner 1 all cited above. 
For earlier ones, see citations in Bain, "Price and Production Policies," 
loc. cit. 
45 On coal, see Jacob ,SchmoOkle:.r, "The Bituminous Coal Industry I" in Walter 
Adams (editor), The Structure of American Industry, revised edition (New 
York: MacMillan Company, 1954), Ch. 3. · 
46 Sometimes flexible prices are simply held to be an unacceptable or other-
wise impractical remedy. A theoretical objection, however 1 originates in 
the likelihood that falling prices would set up unhealthy price expectations. 
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The secular adjustment problem seems more relevant, although again 
the problem of identifying parallel situations is with us as well as the problem 
of measuring them. Bituminous coal, cement, flour, textiles (especially the 
older fibers), aircraft (airframes), beer, household mechanical stokers and 
oil burners, ships, and wool carpets and rugs are only a few products which 
have seen trouble. Mentioning downtown hotels, butcher shops (independent 
of grocery stores), movie theaters, and urban public transportation should 
remind you of many others. Less permanent cases of excess capacity, yet 
perhaps not strictly cyclical ones, appear in steel, aluminum, and "medium 
priced" automobiles. Regional problems, often associated with specific 
industries, are much in the news today. In New England and in some mining 
areas, they have long passed from the category of news. 
These examples suggest that the industrial sector of the economy does 
not always find a quick solution to its secular excess capacity problems. 
More readily than in agriculture, however, manufacturers and distributors 
sometimes can transfer much of their capacity to new or different products. 
The April 8, 1961, issue of Business Week presents a lengthy survey of "The 
Big Switch From Aircraft. " Grumman is making a hydrofoil boat; Martin has 
converted to missile making and electronics; and Lockheed, we learn , 
has even bought a sewage disposal plant. In the ballpoint pen market, we 
read in the New York Times of April 16, 19 61: 
Scripto and other industry leaders have watched profits shrink 
rapidly in recent months under the twin pressures of over-
production and price cutting. Intensive advertising and 
promotion campaigns have brought only marginal improvement. 
Scripto announces its new remedy, a "tilt-tip pen. " Retailers likewise 
constantly adjust their product lines to replace unprofitable items. 
Of course, excess capacity which reduces prices and profits also is 
an incentive for monopolistic schemes, governmentally sanctioned (as in 
Texas oil production) or otherwise. It was a factor in the electrical equip-
ment conspiracy. One wonders what John R. Kennedy of the Federal Paper 
Board Company, Inc., has in mind for his industry, which the New York Times 
reports is facing price problems "symptomatic of the intense competition 
within an industry confronted by the effects of its own surplus productive 
capacity as well as the decline in the general economy. " Kennedy's report 
to his stockholders, in April 1961, notes, 
As in many other industries, there exists some over-capacity 
in our industry .... This overcapacity, however, is not so 
great as to be the determining factor in the unsettled conditions 
-. __ 
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and lower earnings experienced by the industry. Sound 8 
constructive industry marketing practices and policies 
would do much to re-establish proper earnings ratios. 4 7 
What happened to hula hoop production capacity o I don't pretend to 
know. The industry didn't last long enough for either industrial statesmanship 
or public policy to come to the rescue. In other areas of secular over-
capacity 1 whether or not prices have been maintained (and usually they 
weaken 1 not instantaneously 1 but inevitably), there have been severe losses 
in profits and employment. It seems doubtful that New England textile 
manufactures 1 pre-World War II rubber and tire manufacturers, commuter 
railways, ortlie nation's breweries really have much in example or consolation 
to offer the farmer, except as misery likes company. 
Still another phase I shall not attempt to touch 8 in spite of its 
relevance 1 is that industrial price rigging and other monopolistic practices 
are not only a response to excess capacity, but may also be a cause of it. 48 
How These Findings Relate to Farm Policy Proposals 
We have seen that (1) competitive and monopolistic elements blend in 
varying proportions in different industrial markets, and that (2) there is 
consequently great danger in attempting to characterize the extent of monopoly 
in the huge nonagricultural sector by incautious phrases or oversimplified 
averages. 
Too often the nonfarm sector is "represented" in discussion by 
industries like steel and automobile manufacturing o and firms like General 
Motors or (not surprisingly in current discussion) General Electric. But the 
near-pathological postwar price and output performance of the steel industry 
is clearly extreme. Surely and fortunately, in no way does it "typify" 
Ame'rican industry. Its behavior cannot reasonably justify abandonment of 
competition in other markets where such competition is effective, nor is its 
price-output performance something that agriculture--or any other industry--
47 New York Times, April 23, 1961, Sec. 3, p. 5. For the price cutting effects 
of cyclical excess capacity in industrial markets, see the lead article of 
Wall Street Journal (Midwest Edition), June 19 o 1961. It reads I in part: 
"Price cuts, both announced and unannounced, are being made by manufacturers 
on a widening range of products they supply to other business firms. The price 
cutting that's come to light recently in steel. .. is typical of what's happening ... 
Whatever the reasons, there's no doubt the price cutting is widespread ... 11 
A large number of examples are quoted. 
48 See Samuel M. Loescher, Imperfect Collusion in the Cement Industry 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), and the classical 
theoretical contribution of E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933). There 
are several kinds of 11 excess capacity, 11 it must be noted. 
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should want to imitate. 49 Again, exactly what beyond mere special pleading 
justifies using (as I have seen used) General Motors as a sample firm instead 
of Studebaker-Packard? Or instead of one of the third of a million eating 
and drinking businesses? 
Another special group of industries-agricultural supply and food 
processing and marketing-has also often been chosen for discussion by farm 
spokesmen and agricultural economists. Much of this interest grows out of 
the long-standing preoccupation with "marketing margins. " It is hoped that 
gains from increasing efficiency in these activities will be passed back to 
farmers--a difficult point to establish. 50 Or it is contended that greater 
farmer "bargaining power" in the specific narrow sense of power .!_n these 
particular markets might enable agriculture to take a larger share of the con-
sumer's dollar without risk of affecting retail prices and, consequently, in-
citing reaction from the general public. Whether this can be done requires a 
concrete, detailed analysis of vertical relationships in each market, case by 
case. For this purpose it is irrelevant what degree of monopoly there is or 
may be one day in this area taken as a whole, still less in the entire non-
agricultural economy. Only the facts in each specific market are germane. 
But if the object is to point to these industries as justification for a 
broader kind of farm policy designed to give agriculture the equivalent of 
monopoly power held by others in the economy at large, this choice of industries 
is strategically a poor one. For, notwithstanding the existence of some 
monopoly, the food processing and marketing industries are, on the whole, 
among our economy's most competitive. 51 
49 In production technique and product innovation, however, I believe the 
industry earns higher marks. 
50 See statements by Herman M. Southworth and Kenneth E. Ogren in Policy 
for Commercial Agriculture, hearings before the Subcommittee on Agricultural 
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Wash-
ington: U.S.G.P,.O., 1958}, pp. ll3 and ll9. 
51 As a sample, consult chapter on meat packing by Simon N. Whitney, in his 
Antitrust Policies, vol. 1 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958}; on 
grocery retailing, see Adelman, op. cit.; Bob R. Holdren, The Structure .2!_ 
a Retail Market and the Market Behavior of Retail Units (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1960); Staff Report to the Federal Trade Com-
mission, Economic Inquiry Into Food Marketing, Part I: "Concentration 
and Integration in Retailing" (Washington: U.S. G. P. 0. , 1960)7 and Willard 
F. Mueller and Leon Garoian, Changes in the Market Structure of Grocery 
Retailing (Madison, Wis. : The University of Wisconsin Press, 1961). The 
last two are much concerned with possible trends toward concentration and 
monopoly, but my impression is that the picture at present is mainly 
competitive, though not in all respects. 
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In addition to the problem of selecting or averaging industries, there 
are other problems. Where monopoly does occur it often does bring extra-
ordinary profits which fall visibly into the hands of a few monopolists. How-
ever, earnings of a monopoly may in other cases be distributed rather widely 
or in a manner not easy to trace. How, then, can one interpret':the resulting 
income distribution in equity terms, where individuals, rather than firms or 
unions, are the relevant "units" ? 
Or 1 again, business strategies may be offsetting to the point where 
certain firms or even whole groups of firms are not able to earn extra-normal 
profits at all. Yet there is probably mal-allocation of resources frcum the 
social point of view. Society loses, but neither managers, stockholders, nor 
labor necessarily acquires monopoly gains. How does this kind of result 
affect the use of industrial monopoly as a justification on the grounds of 
equity for increasing farmers' bargaining power? Or as an example agriculture 
might want to imitate? 
Conclusions 
Many persons who are concerned with public policy for agriculture are 
interested in monopoly in the nonfarm sector because they believe it might 
provide (1) a justification and possibly (2) a model to imitate for policies 
intended to benefit farmers through increasing their bargaining power. 
But have they carefully considered whether they want to take justifica-
tion and model from the monopolistic extremes of the nonfarm economy of from 
average or "typical" industrial markets? 
And how do these investigators feel, at the same time, about antitrust 
policies that are intended to destroy the power of the monopolistic extremes? 
If successful, these policies would remove the most flagrant exhibitions of 
monopoly and, moreover, reduce the size of the "average degree of monopoly." 
But wouldn't this result weaken the justification-- and transform the model--
for this kind of agricultural policy? 
This, of course, simply reminds us of alternative means of raising the 
bargaining power of agriculture, in the broad sense relative to the economy as 
a whole. First, we could give more bargaining power to agriculture. 
Alternatively, we could reduce monopoly in other sectors or subsectors. My 
own preference should be clear. But those who would choose the first course 
will still have to justify selecting electrical equipment, steel, or automobiles 
as the examples agriculture should imitate, instead of women's apparel. 
manufacturing, retail grocery selling 1 or hundreds of other members of the 
great nonfarm economy who may also claim to be "typical." 
THE AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION AND BARGAINING 
POWER FOR FARMERS 
by Lee Kolmer1 
The program of the American Farm Bureau Federation is concerned with 
improving the economic position of the farmer. It is not a program to secure 
bargaining power through supply control, as the term has been primarily 
employed in this seminar. The Farm Bureau is making no attempt to secure 
control of a large segment of the output of a particular commodity for the 
purpose of holding it off the market and, through this control, bargain for 
better prices or market conditions. It hopes to inject more competition into 
the system and at the same time obtain prices that may be above the general 
level of prices for a particular commodity. 
This higher price does not represent compensation for control exercised 
by the Farm Bureau in the market but compensation for marketing services pro-
vided the buyer. These services might include (1) assembly; (2) grading, 
sorting, and packaging; (3) relatively large volume lots in each grade; and 
(4) market information concerning available supplies and prospective supplies. 
In short, the Farm Bureau activities might be described as an attempt 
to improve the farmers 1 economic position by assuming some of the marketing 
functions and implicitly threatening to assume additional functions. The 
Farm Bureau attempts to increase returns to farmers by: 
1. Retaining profits now going to other marketing agencies. 
2. Introducing efficiencies which will reduce costs and increase net 
revenues. 
In discussions with Farm Bureau officials the objective of supply 
control was never mentioned as a primary objective of the organization at this 
time. However, Farm Bureau officials did emphasize that the objectives of 
the organization may change, and I have no doubt that if they decided this 
objective were feasible at some time in the future, they would attempt supply 
control. 
The program of the American Farm Bureau Federation, as presently 
organized, has two major aspects -- developing foreign markets and strengthen-
ing bargaining associations for domestic producers. Foreign market develop-
ment has been concentrated in Western Europe. The Farm Bureau maintains an 
office in Rotterdam and through this office attempts to bring Western European 
buyers of agricultural products in contact with United States processors and 
handlers of these products. The Farm Bureau 1 s European representatives, in a 
1 Associate Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. 
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sense I operate as brokers. In addition I they attempt to arrange meetings 
between prospective buyers and United States processors at trade fairs and 
similar events in Europe. At one recent trade fair they arranged a meeting 
between the buying executives of a group of Western European supermarkets 
and the sales executives of the Campbell Soup Company, in an effort to 
expand the market for American branded products in European retail outlets. 
Through activities such as this the Farm Bureau hopes to shift the demand 
curve for United States farm products in European to the right. 
At the present time 1 the Farm Bureau does not take title to goods. 
However 1 Farm Bureau officials indicated that if quality standards and 
uniformity require it 1 they may take title to products at some time in the future. 
Also at present 1 they do not charge a finder's fee. Here again 1 if they are 
successful in Europe they feel they may be forced to charge a fee. 
The Rotterdam office also is responsible for keeping the Farm Bureau 
informed on legislative proposals in Europe that may affect the market 
position of United States agriculture. For example 1 recently the Common 
Market nations were deliberating whether they should pursue a policy 
encouraging self-sufficiency in food production in Western Europe. The 
Rotterdam office made a report of this so the Farm Bureau was in a position 
to bring its influence (political and otherwise) to bear on this problem. 
On the domestic side 1 the Farm Bureau has formed a corporation to 
act as a selling agent for member cooperatives. Membership is by application, 
and any cooperative certified by a state Farm Bureau organization is eligible 
for membership. The purpose is to provide a nationwide product clearing 
house and selling agency. This program is in the initial stages and the only 
commodities under consideration at present are fruits and vegetables. Michigan 
and California organizations are the most active in the program at present. 
Conceivably if this program is successful and eventually includes Farm 
Bureau affiliated cooperatives in all commodities 1 a considerable degree of 
supply control may be effected. Under such conditions the American Farm 
Bureau Federation could divert or destroy a portion of the total supply to 
raise prices. Perhaps at such times 1 supply control will be an explicit 
objective rather than an implicit objective as it is now. 
In addition to engaging in selling activities 1 the Farm Bureau market 
corporation provides legal counsel and market information to affiliated 
cooperatives. The aim is to strengthen and build from present cooperatives 
rather than to form new organizations. Farm Bureau officials emphasized that 
the entire program is in the formative stage and that the ultimate form and 
nature of the marketing corporation would only be determined after an 
experimental period. 
The American Farm Bureau Federation has requested that each state 
Farm Bureau set up a marketing corporation or department to work with the 
national Farm Bureau organizer stationed in Chicago. 
75 
Farm Bureau activities may eventually result in bargaining power or 
supply control even und~r the vague and nebulous framework we have outlined 
in this seminar. However 1 at present 1 the Farm Bureau is primarily a marketing 
agency in competition with other marketing agencies. 

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY PRODUCER GROUPS 
by Francis A. Kutish l 
In discussing collective bargaining by producer groups I would like 
to set up what I think are some of the requirements for successful collective 
bargaining. Collective bargaining is presently being done by the National 
Farm Organization, I want to look at how well the methods employed by the 
NFO meet the requirements of successful collective bargaining as developed 
by G. Alvin Carpenter, Extension Economist, Marketing, University of 
California. 
There are five major requirements for successful collective bargaining: 
(l) The organization must be realistic and consistent in asking for what 
it can get. 
(2) The negotiators must be well fortified with economic information 
about the producers, processors and consumers before they under-
take to bargain. 
(3) The officers, the people and the management also must have 
bargaining know-how. 
( 4) The management or agency must have the confidence and loyalty 
of the producers. On the other hand, the agents must command 
the respect of the processors with whom they're going to dear. 
(5) The bargaining agent must be able to speak for a significant 
number of growers. In addition, he must control the timing I 
volume and direction bf flow to market of production of adequate 
size to cause the buyers to want to negotiate with him. These 
are the essential ingredients for effective bargaining activities, 
It is no simple matter to be a bargaining agent and to maintain 
popularity with hundreds of producers on the one hand and the 
respect of several processors on the other. 
Bargaining is the continual process of arriving at some sort of an 
agreement. First 1 it is necessary to reach agreement among the growers on 
the price for which they're going to bargain; second, it is necessary to try to 
reach an agreement with processors concerning this price and other conditions 
of exchange. The processors, however, will also have a price for which 
they will begin to negotiate. Their price will be consistent with their views 
l 
Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. 
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of the market situation, general economic conditions and their own interests 
in profits and resource returns. This might coincide with the producers' 
ideas but probably not. Then the bargaining process begins. 
Let's look at the actions of the NFO in terms of this five-point 
framework: 
First, are the NFO's requests consistent and realistic? The prices 
sought by the NFO thus far have been determined partially at least on the 
basis of popular vote. They have not been arrived at primarily as a result 
of a consideration of the supply and demand situation. 
Second, are the negotiators well-fortified w'ith necessary economic 
information? This is difficult to say. I was informed once at an NFO meeting 
by some members of the collective bargaining group that they do not believe 
in supply and demand. They said quantity had no relationship to price. Prices 
are set, they said,· by m'Onopoiistic eteinent's' irl: the 'economy. They could be 
set at any particular figure. 
However, the assumption that the meat packing industry is highly 
monopolistic with strictly monopolistic pricing practices is not accurate. 
Earning returns do not bear this out. 
There is probably a difference between what the NFO membership 
believes and what officials of the organization believe. The latter are 
conscious of the necessity for realism and good economic information. With-
holding action specifically has been used as a means of demonstrating the 
organization's strength and attracting new: members. This doesn't have any 
real lasting effect upon prices. But if tne organization can get sufficient 
members it can undertake other activities. 
Third, does the agent have bargaining know-how? I do not think we 
can answer this question in evaluating the holding actions. These actions 
have not involved bargaining. Thus bargaining ability has never been 
demonstrated because there hasn't been any bargaining yet. 
Fourth, does the bargaining agent have the confidence of the producers 
and processors? I think they have the confidence of the producers. There is 
zeal among these people, an acceptance of the goals of the organization. 
The producer members have confidence. But the processors do noLrecognize 
the bargaining agent as an official representative or of significant influence 
to command their respect. 
Fifth, are they able to attract and hold a sufficient number of growers 
and control a sufficient volume of the industry's production to be effective? 
In some areas many have been attracted. The contract specifies that at the 
option of the organization every producer will be required to turn over selling 
all of his produce. Holding growers for the length of the contract seems assured. 
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Both cattle and hogs are nationally produced 1 nationally processed 
and nationally marketed. They are quite different from fruits and vegetables. 
Cattle and hogs 1 as well as feed grain, are produced under almost perfect 
competition. Bargaining associations can most readily improve the status 
of farmers in segments of agriculture where monopolistic elements are.-
already the rule rather than the exception. Where effective control of 
volume exists or can be secured and where effective bargaining techniques 
are employed, I think the bargaining associations also can influence the 
price as they have influenced the contract provisions. 
But it is well to remember that the collective bargaining techniques 
are no cure-all for all of the marketing problems of the farmers. Only under 
certain conditions and with the proper leadership can professional bargaining 
be an effective tool. 

BARGAINING POWER AND FEDERAL MILK ORDERS 
FOR FLUID MILK PRODUCERS 
by J. R. Strain 1 
In Iowa there is probably no agricultural commodity group that is more 
completely organized or that has realized more financial gains through bargain-
ing than,~ptoducers of ,grade A milk. A. few groups of grade A. producers are 
either incompletely organized or not organized at all. However, a single 
organization represents all of the producers in most of the larger market areas. 
There also are many organizations of ungraded producers, but most of 
these are on a much smaller scale than grade A. producers. Members join 
solely to process their milk on a joint basis, not to gain bargaining strength. 
In general, they do no bargaining. They take the price offered for their product 
by their marketing agency. 
However, there is one exception to this general situation. State Brand 
Creameries market the output of their affiliated plants with all of the sales 
techniques at their command, including some promotion I advertising, and 
bargaining. 
Grade A producers have made many apparent economic gains through 
their bargaining strength and through federal milk marketing orders. The 
intent of this paper is to examine the history of grade A bargaining associations 
and the peculiarities of the grade A product market in order·to evaluate the 
possibilities for similar gains to other agricultural commodities. 
The Beginning 
At one time milk was milk as far as its use and price were concerned. 
However, as the economy began to grow and distribution systems became 
more complex, keeping quality became a concern, and milk-borne disease 
problems appeared. Taste preferences expressed by consumers and sanitary 
standards set by health authorities resulted in the establishment of a special 
"fluid" grade of milk. This milk was produced and handled with specified 
equipment and under specif~:e~ condi:tion:s to ,qualify for lise in the fluid form. 
This grade evolved into .our present grade A. milk program. 
Special equipment and handling procedures made grade A milk production 
more costly than under conventional methods. The consumer demand schedule 
permitted charging a higher retail price and paying a substantially higher farm 
price for fluid milk. However 1 the amount of milk that could be marketed 
at higher prices in fluid fonm was fairly consistent throughout the year; the 
1 Assistant Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. 
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production of milk that qualified for fluid use varied widely between summer 
and winter. During short seasons there often was not enough qualified milk 
to fill demands at the going ~:price. At other times a large surplus had to be 
marketed at lower prices for use in manufactured products such as butter and 
cheese. Thus the farm price a distributor could pay for qualified milk depended 
not only on amount of additional returns realized from the sale 'of milk in the 
bottle, but also on the proportion of qualified milk he received that could be 
sold in fluid form. 
Setting for Cooperative Action 
In the beginning many individual farmers separately offered their 
qualified milk for whatever preTIJ.i'um price they could obtain. Separately 
they had little effect on that price. They sold to relatively large buying units, 
which varied considerably in the type of use they made of the milk and hence 
the returns they could realize from its sale. 
Distributors who sold most of their input as bottle milk realized a 
higher average return than those who had to process a considerable amount of 
it into cheese or butter. Yet all tended to pay about the same price at the 
farm for this qualified milk. The price was usually established by the plants 
with the largest surplus. 
Also in these early days, the product offered by farmers varied con-
siderably in quality and other characteristics even though it was approved for 
fluid use. -This variation often prompted plants with more milk than they 
could bottle to quit buying from certain producers, sometimes permanently and 
sometimes just for the summer, to keep their average returns as high as 
possible. This practice left 'farmers who had no market often willing to under-
cut their ne~ghbors to obtain a market<: above the cheese milk price. When a 
dealer found he could buy one farmer's milk for a lower price, he tended to 
use this as a lever for buying everyone's milk at a lower price. This jockeying 
often led to disorderly marketing. 
Development of Cooperative Bargaining Associations 
In this setting the cooperative bargaining association movement developed 
in an attempt to improve producers' income. The associations sought to raise 
the bargaining power of the individuals by amassing a comparatively large 
volume of the supply for a market area and putting its administration in the 
hands of a skilled sales executive. 
They developed a cl'assified pricing system in which dealers were 
charged for the milk they received according to the use they made of it. Thus 
a dealer who sold a large part of hls purchases in bottle form no longer had 
the advantage of a greater average return over the dealer with a large surplus. 
In theory, this policy reduced the incentive of a plant with more milk than it 
needed for bottling purposes to quit buying from producers at will. 
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The "pooling" practice was developed along with classified pricing. 
In effect all sales were lumped together, whether for class I (fluid use) or 
for surplus, and a uniform blend price was determined. Thus with all 
producers sharing in class I sales, individual producers no longer had in-
centive to undercut their neighbor to obtain a higher return for their milk. 
Full acceptance of these cooperative programs was retarded considerably 
by variation in the products mentioned above. Thus cooperatives in general 
embarked on an extensive program for improving product quality, standardizing 
grading I and bettering assembly methods. In some cases, surplus milk was 
processed in cooperatively-owned plants to lower handling costs and increase 
returns to members. 
Local Markets 
Primarily, the activities mentioned thus far relied upon differing demand 
schedules for the various uses of the same product. Equally important to the 
pattern of development of producer groups is the fact that fluid milk markets 
are relatively local in scope. Qualified milk in the fluid form has been 
relatively perishable and bulky (thus costly to transport from market to market) 
when compared with products such as butter, pork 1 corn 1 beef 1 or wheat. 
When the sociological and psychological problems or organizing relatively 
small groups of milk producers were overcome, these groups could then 
bargain, invest in facilities, and obtain a considerable economic advantage 
before their gains became large enough to attract a supply from producers in 
another market..· This situation made possible market-by-market organization 
of producers a much easier accomplishment than simultaneous organization of 
all producers of a region or a nation. 
Federal Order Program 
The cooperatives often had considerable difficulty in initiating the 
classified pricing system, in bargaining for gains, and in realizing that a 
bargain, once reached, would be honored. Firms marketing as processed 
dairy products a high proportion of the milk they bought from farmers wanted a 
pricing program which would permit them to pay producers a price equivalent 
to that paid by firms selling most of their milk in the bottle. Those who 
sold a relatively high proportion of their milk in bottle form preferred to buy 
at a classified use price in order to maintain a stable and high quality 
supply. Many stories have been told of dealers who refused to purchase the 
milk of the officers of a co-op (for "quality" reasons) or offered the co-op 
officers a special price to discourage their concern for the general interest 
of the entire co-op membership. Dealers who did bargain with a local 
association often would refuse any form of audit so that the co-op never knew 
for sure if milk purchased at a lower:price for use in manufactured dairy 
products didn't end up in the bottle. 
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These difficulties reached their peak in the early 1930's with groups 
of farmers occasionally dumping milk I shooting holes through tankers 1 and so 
forth. At this point the Federal Order Program began with the objective of 
promoting orderly marketing and establishing a price for fluid milk that would 
assure an adequate and dependable supply the year around. The Federal 
program adopted the practice of classifying prices arid pooling of receipts 
(initiated by the cooperatives) and instituted a federal audit as a means of 
verifying the usage of the milk in each price category. 
Basis of Bargaining Gains to Fluid Milk Producers 
The gains achieved by grade A producers have not been solely through 
organization, bargaining strength, or the Federal Order Program. Two con-
tributing phenomena 1 both unique to fluid milk, have provided the setting 
within which the other activities have operated. One is the substantially 
smaller elasticity of demand that exists for milk in the fluid form compared 
with milk in the many alternative manufactured product uses. The other is 
a relatively local market situation for fluid milk 1 permitting relatively small 
groups of producers to organize 1 bargain I and retain the gains obtained by 
these activities for their members. The organization of producers 1 bargaining 
strength, and government regulation 1 working within this unique economic 
situation, have brought substantial gains to producers of grade A milk. 
Possibilities for Other Groups 
The above discussion indicates that success in transferring the organiza-
tion I methods 1 and government regulation used successfully in marketing 
fluid milk to other commodities such as manufactured milk will hinge on the 
elasticity of demand of the various uses of the commodity. For instance, 
manufactured milk does have many uses, but the demand schedules for these 
various uses appear so similar and interrelated that mi'nor gains may be the 
best that can be hoped for. Furthermore 1 markets for these products are so 
universal that a producer organization which gains a price advantage of only 
a cent or two in given areas I such as the Chicago metropolitan market, may 
be confronted by a flood of easily substitutable products from New York 1 
Florida, California 1 or Oregon. Perishability, quality, and transportation 
cost restrictions are so small for most of these manufactured products that a 
program of market-by-market development, as occurred with fluid milk, 
could not retain in the local area the gains of such development. The gains 
would be dissipated quickly to other producers and other areas. If such 
gains are possible and if the producers who bear the cost of development are 
to retain the benefits 1 they will have to be obtained on a national or at least 
a regional basis. 
Currently, a similar situation seems to exist for every other major 
agricultural product marketed from Iowa farms. Thus the possibility of 
producers gaining from organizing and proceeding in a way similar to that 
followed by the grade A associations appears extremely limited both from the 
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point of view of the scale of the organization required and the similarities that 
exist in the elasticity of the demand for the various uses of these commodities. 
Role of Government 
If producer groups can isolate similar phenomena for other agricultural 
products, they may require government assistance in organizing on a production-
wide basis and in developing a discriminatory pricing arrangement to take 
advantage of their findings. Past experience in the milk industry indicates that 
if the same buyer makes two or more products from the same but discriminatingly 
priced raw material, market order and federal audit may be required. On the 
other hand, if each use of a product requires a separate sale to a separate 
buyer, a government market order may offer no advantage. 

BARGAINING POWER POSSIBILITIES IN THE COOPE·RATIVE 
MARKETING OF DURUM 
by J. T. Scott 1 
Introduction 
World wheat production for 1960 was estimated at 8, 180,000,000 
bushels. 2 The United States i'1ccounted for 1, 36 3, 443, 000 bushels of this 
production. 
United States 
17% 
Rest of world 83% 
Fig. 3. World wheat production, 19 GO. 
Durum wheat production in the United States in 1960 was estimated at 
33,969,000 bushels out of a total United States wheat production of 1, 363,443,000 
bushels. 3 
1 Associate Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. 
2
"The Wheat Situation," ERS, USDA, Aprill961, pp. 16 and 17. 
3"TheWheat Situation," ERS, USDA, February 1961, p. 12. 
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-------_.JDurum 2.5% 
Other wheat 97.5% 
Fig. 4. United States wheat production for 1960 
The production of durum is highly concentrated. North Dakota, the 
leading state, accounted for 26,880,000 bushels of the 33,969,000 bushels 
of durum produced in the United States in 19 6 0. 4 The bulk of the North 
Dakota durum is produced in the northeastern part of the state in a small 
triangular-shaped territory around Devils Lake. 
S. Dakota 7% 
North Dakota 79% 
Fig. S. Geographic location of durum wheat production in the United States, 1960. 
Durum production has been attempted in many states since the first seed was 
brought to this country in 1898 1 but North Dakota has emerged as the dominant 
producer. The climate and soil of that state permit the growth of a product that is 
generally of higher quality than that produced in other areas. 
4 
"Crop Production, 1960 Annual Summary,'' AMS 1 USDA, December 16, 1960, 
p. 63. 
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Processing 
The method of processing of durum depends on the end product for which it 
is selected. The three markets for durum in the United States are (1) the puffing 
market (i.e. , puffed wheat market), (2) the spaghetti and macaroni market, and 
(3) the noodle market. 
The puffing market uses only the fanciest, plumpest durum. Spaghetti 
and macaroni are made from the better grades. The poorer quality durum is 
used in making noodles and "alphabets" for soups. 
Durum is not used as a bread wheat in the Unites States. A. one-pound 
durum loaf makes a much smaller loaf than do the bread wheats. The consumer 
prefers the larger loaves. 
Position of Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association 
--
The Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association (GTA.) handles approximately 
40 percent of the durum produced in the United States. It receives part of the 
grain of member elevators located in the durum producing areas for use in its 
processing plant at Rush City, Minn. The member elevators sell the rest of 
their grain to the seven other firms which comprise the durum milling industry. 
The output of the Rush City plant (semolina and durum flour) represents approxi-
mately 10 percent of the industry total and is sold to other firms for final 
processing. The GTA. is not represented among the more than 200 companies 
doing the final processing. 
The GTA. is not the only integrated firm in the industry. Other firms buy 
part of their durum needs from the GTA., but they are not entirely dependent on 
the association for their supplies. Some own country elevators in the durum 
producing areas and buy part of their supplies directly from farmers. 
Possibilities for Increasing Producers' Returns 
Can GTA. enhance the prices received for durum by farmers? Officials of 
GTA. think they can and have received better prices in the short run through 
judicious use of storage facilities. The long-run story, however, is somewhat 
different because the association must handle the quantity that farmers want to 
market. Consequently the association has no control over the durum supply 
and therefore none over the long-run price level. 
Then what are the possibilities for getting better prices for durum and 
durum products if one ignores short-run storage operations? The long-run 
situation is extremely difficult to assess. However, some knowledge can be 
acquired by the exploring several related questions. First, are the possibilities 
for durum price gains relative to other wheat prices limited by opportunities 
for substitution in production and/or substitution in consumption. 
Second, are there price-enhancing possibilities arising from GTA.' s relative! y 
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large size and market share? Third, is GTA's market share vulnerable to 
competitors? Finally, does the presence of a cooperative affect prices under 
an oligopoly situation? 
Substitution in Production 
Farmers in the major producing areas grow both durum and hard red spring 
wheat when growing durum becomes less profitable. Conversely, they plant 
more durum if durum wheat prices rise in relation to other wheat prices. Durum, 
however, is generally the favored crop, even at a lower price, for it produces 
higher yields per acre than hard red spring wheat. As in any producing area, 
there are farms where this yield advantage is small and others where it is quite 
large. Allowing for such differences and assuming the price of other wheats to 
be constant, we can suggest a long-run supply curve for durum. 
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Durum supply 
/curve 
Op = Price of 11 other wheat, 11 
which is assumed constant 
Quantity of durum 
F1g. 6. Long-run supply situation. 
The durum supply curve under such circumstances can be pictured as 
having three distinct segments. The segments are pictured in fig. 6 as straight 
lines' to simplify the illustration. The upper segment represents the situation when 
durum sells at a premium over other wheats. The middle segment represents the 
situation prevailing when durum sells at a discount--but at a discount too small to 
offset the advantage of durum' s superior yielding qualities on all farms in the durum 
areas. The lower segment represents the situation when durum sells at such a 
discount that other wheats can be grown more profitably. If durum prices fell to 
such a low level, there would be (with some lag due to imperfect knowledge) a 
shift out of durum production into other wheat production (i.e. , the supply curve 
would become perfectly elastic). If durum were selling at a premium over other 
wheat, the supply curve would be much more inelastic as is shown in the upper 
segment. 
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The middle segment has an elasticity somewhere between these two 
extremes. This segment accounts for the fact that dururrt out yields other 
wheat more on some land than on other. Therefore I with each small re-
duction in the durum price 1 a few more farms wi 11 find it profitable to shift 
out of durum. Thus for any given drop in price there will be a greater 
reduction in supply than would prevail for an equivalent price reduction 
when durum is at a premium. Note that the actual situation is probably 
a smooth curve with only a suggestion of a corner. Obvious! y the shift 
depicted in the middle segment is also operative to a somewhat lesser 
degree in the corners and on the other two segments. 
Substitution in Consumption 
Can other wheats be substituted for durum in the preparation of 
macaroni and other products usually made from durum? The answer to 
this question is still in doubt. However 1 when durum was scarce in the 
early 1950's some substitutions were made. In fact some durum product 
manufacturers found it necessary to manufacture their finished products 
entirely from wheats other than durum. The complete substitution resulted 
• in an acceptable product in the sense that it was not criticized by the con-
sumer. Whether a prolonged offering of non-durum macaroni products would 
result in lessened demand for such products is not certain. Nevertheless 1 
it does seem probable that substitutions of non-durum ingredients will be 
made if durum sells at substantial premiums over .other wheats. 
. . 
The durum product demand curve is shown in fig. 7. The actual situa-
tion would be shown by a gently rounded curve since each processor and 
consumer would shift from durum at a different price. 
Durum demand 
Op = Price of 11 other wheat, 11 
which is assumed constant 
o~-----------------------. Quantity of durum 
Fig. 7. Long-run demand situation facipg 
the farmer and/or his representative. 
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The "kink" in this demand schedule would be less pronounced in a short 
time period. Because of custom and the processors' fixed investments and also 
because of lack of knowledge, a sharp shift away from durum would be less 
likely in the short run. Of course the durum seller's chances of getting a very 
high premium in the long run are almost nil. 
Putting these two concepts {supply, fig. 6 and demand, fig. 7) together 
with other pertinent information, we find that the durum price will not be the 
same as the price for other wheat except by coincidence. However, it should 
move with other wheat prices 1 and over the long run, durum prices relative to 
other wheat prices should not be higher than the ''kink" in the demand curve 
nor lower than the lowest "kink" in the supply curve. 
Market Share Considerations 
GTA is one of eight firms involved in the first processing stage, during 
which durum is made into semolina and durum flour. It has approximately 10 
percent of the industry's capacity. With only a few firms and a product which 
is relatively homogeneous, in the first processing stage the industry seems to 
be an oligopoly. 
An oligopoly is said to exist when "each firm must ask itself what will 
be the effect of its action upon the behavior of other firms. "5 One can be 
relatively certain that each of the eight firms is painfully aware of the retaliatory 
threat of the others to any contemplated price changes. This situation should 
be equally true at the terminal grain-marketing stage, during which GTA handles 
40 percent of the durum produced in the United States. 
From the foregoing discussion of the market structure one might speculate 
that durum prices are higher than they would be under perfectly competitive 
conditions. Price leadership in buying and selling could develop where there 
are such a small number of firms. There are factors that make this supposition 
somewhat doubtful, however. For one thing, none of the oligopolists has any 
control over the supply of durum. Second, one of the oligopolists is a coopera-
tive. 
The durum producers determine the amount of durum to be planted; there-
fore, elevators and processors have little control over the long-run supply. 
They can affect the short-run offerings by storage operations, but over the 
longer haul they must process and sell all durum produced. If one processor 
refused to buy from a farmer 1 the processor's competitors would gladly handle 
the entire crop. Thus the individual processing firm can have little effect on 
the total supply marketed, consequently little effect on durum prices. The 
obstructionist would succeed only in reducing his own profits below what they 
could have been. 
5 Boulding, Kenneth C., Economic Analysis, (revised ed.; New York: Harper 
&Bros.), p. 580. 
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Of course a firm could decide to buy a large quantity of durum and destroy 
it. This action would reduce the long-run supply I therepy increasing price. 
The firm taking such unilateral action would probably have to control more than 
half of the crop to benefit from such action 1 however. Lucrative crop reduction 
would likely require concerted effort by firms handling more than 70 percent of 
the crop. Since this action would be difficult to achieve 1 it appears unlikely 
that durum middlemen will do anything other than market the amount produced. 
Vulnerability of Market Share to Other Competitors 
What response could GTA expect from its customers if it announced a 
"high price" for its durum? For one thing such action would allow the other 
handlers to sell a larger share of the durum merchandised provided they could 
obtain their supply directly from elevators or farmers. This alternative is 
within reach of some durum product manufacturers 1 for they own and operate 
elevators in the durum producing areas. Thus 1 GTA stands to lose a part of 
its share of the market if it attempts to extract a premium for durum which is 
not based on competitive market conditions. 
Cooperative Corporation in an Oligopoly Situation 
__ How does the operation of a cooperative affect the oligopoly situation? 
At first glance one might suppose that the participation of a cooperative would 
not affect oligopoly pricing practices. However I "follow the leader" or other 
arrangements which enhance the price of the product will likely result in 
increased net earnings by the participating firms. This creates no problem 
among business corporations other than to attract the attention of potential 
competitors. 
However I the cooperative remits its earnings to member elevators and 
thence to the farmer patron. Since each farm~r ~.patron ·can indep-endent-
ly decide where to market· his. grain I a nu:m:bet would, shift from 
elevators to cooperative elevators dealing with the coo'perative oligopolist 
provided market'prices for all oligopolists were identicaL 
Thus there is a tendency for the product to shift to the cooperative. 
Business corporations resist the short-run temptation to raise industry prices, 
for in so doing they run the risk of reducing their share of the market and 
subsequently their profit. 
Summary 
Briefly, it would appear that the GTA cannot appreciably raise durum 
prices in the long run. The reasons for this are somewhat complex but can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Other wheats can be substituted without too much fear of market 
reactions if durum sells at too high a premium over competing wheats. 
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2. Although only a few firms are represented at the terminal handling 
and first processing stages, there are some factors which would tend to 
defeat price enhancement schemes: 
a. The firms at these two stages cannot in the long run control 
the supply since the farmer makes the production decisions. 
b. Business corporations at these two stages cannot join with 
a cooperative in a price enhancement scheme since the scheme 
would result in greater cooperative patronage dividends and a 
shift of the market to the cooperative. 
c. Some of the larger business corporations have country 
elevators in the durum producing areas. The potential competi-
tion which these elevators represent is a deterrent to any move 
by the cooperative to try to practice marketing restrictions and 
extract higher prices from consumers on its own initiative. 
Any such move would be countered by increased country buying 
by the cooperative's competitors . 
FARMERS' BARGAINING POWER IN THE PRE-SLAUGHTER 
MARKETING OF ONTARIO HOGS 
by T. S. Rackham1 
Setting 
Efforts of Canadian farmers to increase their bargaining power in the 
primary markets have not altogether paralleled those of American farmers. 
Time will permit me only to touch the highlights of one of them -- the now-
successful effort of a producer group in Ontario to gain monopoly control of the 
supply of live hogs in order to secure higher returns. 
Three general conditions differentiate the Canadian from the U. S. hog 
marketing system: 
1. Federal regulation and supervision of grading 1 including grade-price 
differentials and a quality premium program 1 relieve producers and 
processors of any latitude in bargaining within these variables. 
2. Long-established standardization of the bacon-type hog gives the live 
product characteristics of homogeneity 1 so processors generally need 
not be selective to get the kind of hogs they desire. 
3. Grade and premium benefits limit to about one week the optimum 
period in which prime quality hogs can be delivered. Thus there is a 
steady rather than discontinuous flow of hogs to market and it is 
unprofitable for producers to hold their hogs off the market. 
In Ontario three other conditions have been important: 
1. Wartime fixed-contract pricing destroyed competitive marketing and 
led to delivery of nearly all hogs directly to plants. 
2. The large Ontario market is isolated by distance from Canadian sur-
plus hog producing areas. 
3. Truck route and licensing controls restricted the freedom of producers 
to designate where they wanted their hogs delivered. 
Thus producers raised hogs and shipped them off without knowledge of 
price or access to alternative markets in a market completely void of bargaining. 
Bargaining took place between trucker and processor on a transportation cost 
1 Associated with the Department of Agricultural Economics 1 Ontario College 1 
Guelph 1 Ontario 1 Can ada. 
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margin 1 and occasionally truckers could pass some gains back to producers. 
Variation in prices to producers at one plant on the same market day often 
amounted to a dollar per cwL or more, dressed weight. 2 
Dissatisfied with pricing conditions, farmers agitated for more bargaining 
power. Three gains were anticipated from producer control: 
l , Reduced marketing margln s mainly from pressure on processors. 
2, Elimination of under-the-counter trucking and handling kickbacks. 
3, Upward pressure on the retail price to squeeze consumers for addittonal 
nickels and dimes. 
Development of Power in Hog Producers Marketing Board 3 
First 1 the Ontario Hog Producers Association was organized. It worked 
out a scheme under the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Act to set up a 
negotiating committee and agency for selling hogs. This was partially accom-
plished when the Ontario Hog Marketing Board was formed as one of several 
commodity marketing boards under the regulatory Farm Products Marketing 
Board. The hog board collected license fees from producers and through a 
checkoff (2 cents per hog}, the supporting-and-policy-making Ontario Hog 
Producers Association gained strength and unity. An attempt was made to 
negotiate prices in 1951, but no agreement was reached, and the packers 
refused to go to arbitration. The parent provincial Farm Products Marketing 
Board was reluctant to interfere. 
The Hog Marketing Board proceeded to set up a marketing agency by 
unifying the commission firms operating on the stockyards into a single 
selling agency controlled by the board through a contract agreement. The agency 
was empowered to establish prices, sell the product, direct the movement of 
hogs I and handle payments to producers. It sold its hogs to the highest bidder 
and withheld hogs from those not' meeting this bid. However 1 the agency had 
little bargaining power because less than 10 percent of hogs moved into trade 
through the stockyards. Processors paying freight assistance to truckers were 
still able to attract direct shipments in sufficient quantity to offset any increase 
in bargaining power based on loyalty to the hog marketing agency. 
2 T. S. Rackham, "Hog Marketing in Grey County, April 19 50, " Research 
Mimeograph, Economics Division, Canada Dept. of Agriculture, Ottawa, 
3 June, 19 52. 
L. E. Poetschke I and Wm. Mackenzie 1 "The Development of Producer 
Marketing Boards in Canada," Research Bulletin, Dept. of Political Economy, 
University of Alberta, Edmonton, January, 1958. 
97 
New legislation permitted formation of a successor to the contract mar-
keting agency. This was the Ontario Hog Producers Cooperative Ltd. , a sales 
agency directly dependent on the Hog Marketing Board and the policy-making 
Ontario Hog Producers Association. This development brought the producer 
organization into direct conilict with truckers and drovers, who still maintained 
freedom to deliver their hog loads to the processor of their choice. Eventually 
the sales cooperative set up district assembly yards to serve the hog producers 
and sidestep opposing truckers and drovers. The sales cooperative then hir;ed' 
its own staff and trucks to make delivery as it directed. Bargaining power of 
the agency increased as the volume moving independently to processors was 
shut off. 
However, complete control was not achieved until: legislation designated 
the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board and its selling agency as the sole 
marketing agent for all live tiogs produced in the province. This action gave 
the producer organization monopoly control of hog supplies. The organization 
could discriminate between processors by threatening of retaliatory action if 
outside supplies were brought in. 
Operations were centralized by setting up assembly points throughout 
producing areas, maintaining supply information, and dispatching full loads 
by telephone from the central office. The central selling agency analyzed 
trade factors and established prices weekly. The co-op salesman contracted 
prospective purchasers by telephone and accepted price and quantity bids. 
He was able to play one processor against another and delay acceptance of 
offers he deemed unsatisfactory. At times prices were not stab~lized early 
enough to keep hogs rolling to market and processors' killing floors operating. 
Small above-average-quality lots would be sold early to specialty firms to 
set high opening prices. 
This situation led to week-end hog carryovers and tail-end sacrifice 
pricing. This was partly offset by directing the overrun to a cooperative, 
producer-owned packing plant or outside the province to an agency in Montreal, 
a hog deficient area. Packers claimed that to keep plants operating they were 
forced to make bids inconsistent with market demand, that when their storage 
space was filled they had to quit buying. The selling agency claimed this 
practice was really a conspiracy to break the price which the agency's research 
indicated to be consistent with supply-demand relationshiP.s. These claims 
led to conflict among producers, the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board, 
processors, and the Ontario government through the parent, regulating Ontario 
Farm Products Marketing Board. The government ordered the board's selling 
agency (still supported 'py the required two-thirds majority of producers) to set 
up a more acceptable system of marketing hogs by April l, 1961, or suffer its 
compulsory powers to be withdrawn. 
As a result, a teletype system was set up connecting each processor 
with a master teletype unit in the selling office. This is how the system works: 
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The selling agency lists at given offering prices the various lots of hogs 
available in the Ontario area for that market date. If after a given time there 
is no taker at first offering price, the various lots are listed at lower offering 
prices. Buyers can bid on any lot of hogs listed regardless of the point at 
which the hogs are assembled. However, buyers bid on the basis of F.O.B. 
assembly point, so they have to make some adjustment for the cost of transpor-
tation to their plants. The offering price of each lot is progressively reduced 
until a buyer signals his acceptance. His action locks the circuit, ends the 
bidding and notifies other buyers of the sale. Only the sales agency and the 
buyer know who bought the lot in question. The sales agency may, at its 
discretion, refuse a bid and continue offering for sale the lot or portion of lot 
not desired by the purchaser. 
Observations and Conclusions 
Ontario commodity marketing boards such as this one grew out of a back-
ground of Canadian cooperative and government marketing experience. They 
were conceived, according to J. K. Galbraith to "become part of a system of 
countervailing power to offset the concentration of resources and bargaining 
power in large industrial and commercial corporations 1 labor unions and 
supermarket chains." 
They are looked upon as a method of improving bargaining power of 
producers who had so little power that they could only accept or refuse the 
first price offered. Their power potentially would be derived from monopoly 
control over supply of the product in a market. However, the Ontario commodity 
marketing boards in general and the hog producers in particular, have not 
attempted any production control. Thus they lack ability to control or set 
price level. 
I believe the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board anticipated that 
they could gain an advantage over consumers that would force price levels 
up at retail, that they could impose a loss on processors and truckers by 
reducing the operating margins of the latter. 
The attempt 1 in the words of Professors Kaldor and Paulsen, was to 
influence the terms of trade through discriminatory control of the supply variable 
using an instrument sanctioned by the privincial government. This instrument 
was compulsory channeling of all hogs through the board's selling agency, a 
bargaining agent that played an active role as contrasted with the passive 
market role played by sellers before collective union. 
The result was a demonstration that the long-run gains came not from 
bludgeoning power but from perfecting the bargaining process. These are 
relatively small gains in monetary terms but still of value and mutually 
acceptable to the opposed forces. 
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As I see it the gains are these: 
1. Efficiencies in mass full-load collection and movement of hogs with 
minimum disturbance 1 crosshauls 1 overlapping of agents services, and 
communication expenses. 
2. Reduction and prevention of covert marketing practices 1 under-the-counter 
subsidies 1 and so forth 1 with resulting nonmonetary dividends in producer 
confidence 1 in equitable treatment and in better producer-processor 
relationships. 
3. The possibility that the price level will adjust more smoothly to demand 
and supply conditions rather than in the jerky manner pressured by the 
previously imperfectly counterbalanced powers. 
The hog producers have now launched a program to take over processing of 
their own hogs. Ultimately they may attempt to raise or control the price level 
by production control and thereby extract higher prices from consumers -- at 
the risk of attracting supplies from other areas. 

RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN RELATION TO PARTLY 
COMPETITIVE SYSTEMS 
by J. A. Nordin1 
This paper deals with the resource-allocation effects of possible increases 
in the bargaining power of groups of farmers. The major theme is the effects 
of the exercise of monopoly power by farmers on the "quality" of resource 
allocation. That is I we first develop the notion of a desirable allocation of 
resources and then inquire about the impact of a farmer monopoly on this 
allocation. 
Let us consider a simple setting for our problem. Let us assume that: 
1. Labor is the only resource. 
2. Each industry produces only one kind of consumer good in a 
one-stage production process. 
3. In each industry there is only one kind of work 1 and this kind 
orwork is different from the kind of work done in each other 
industry. 
4. There is a market for each consumer good and for each kind of 
work. 
5. On the buying and the selling side of each market there is perfect 
competition (a homogenous product and enough buyers and sellers 
so no buyer or seller thinks he individually can affect the price). 
6. Each worker works a fixed total number of hours per week but is 
free to choose the distribution of his time among kinds of work. 
Let us assume that the society identifies the price of labor for a given 
kind of work as the marginal social sacrifice associated w'fflo. that kind of work---
the social sacrifice caused by using the last unit of labor in the given kind of 
work. That is 1 if each worker does some of each kind of work, he allocates 
his own time so that, relative to other kinds of work 1 the wage for the last 
hour ref each kind of labor just compensates him for the sacrifice he makes by 
being unable to devote that hour of labor to any other kind of work. 
Similarly 1 let us assume that the society identifies the price of a con-
sumer good with the marginal social significance of the good -- the social 
significance of the last unit of the good produced. That is each consumer can 
be assumed to divide his expenditures among consumer goods so that the 
amount of money he pays for his last unit of a good indicates the importance he 
attaches to it. 
1 Professor of Economics and Head of the Department of Economics & Sociology 
at Kansas State University. 
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On the basis of the above interpretaions, the marginal social sacrifice 
in using a marginal unit of labor on consumer good A is equal to the price of a 
unit of labor used on A. (This price may be different from the price of the 
same kind of labor used for other purposes, since the laborers may have prefer-
ences among kinds of work.) 
Similarly, the marginal social significance of using a marginal unit of 
labor on A is the price of A times the resulting number of extra units of A. 
For the use of a marginal unit of labor on A, let us define 
R = price of A times resulting number of extra units of A 
piice of labor used on A 
If the price of labor used on A is constant from the standpoint of the 
producer of A, the marginal cost of A (when the use of labor is increased) is 
equal to the price of labor used on A divided by the resulting number of extra 
units of A; in this case, R can be written as 
R= price of A 
marginal cost of A 
We shall define "R criterion" as the criterion according to which R must 
be 1 for all uses of all resources, which would mean that prices of all goods 
are equated to the marginal costs of producing them. We assume that the 
society adopts the R criterion as a measure of the quality of resource allocation. 
Perfect competition in all markets tends to satisfy this criterion; in a 
perfectly competitive market each seller can maximize his profit by making 
marginal cost equal to price. Since prices are equal for all producers, the R 
criterion is clearly satisfied. 
The monopolist (the sole seller in an industry) maximizes his profit by 
choosing an output at which in expanding output he increases his cost exactly 
as rapidly as he increases his revenue. (Marginal revenue is defined as extra 
revenue per extra unit of output.) The monopolist will make the marginal cost 
of XA equal to the marginal revenue of XA. Since the price of XA will be greater 
than the marginal revenue of XA, R will be greater than 1 in a monopolized 
industry. 
If some industries are monopolized and others are not, then on the basis 
of the R criterion, monopolized industries tend to produce relatively less than 
is desirable from the viewpoint of resource allocation. A monopolist maximizes 
his profit by making his good scarce. He keeps the marginal social significance 
of his product high relative to the marginal social sacrifice needed to produce it. 
He forces the rest of the society to put resources to relatively unimportant uses. 
In some cases there may be reasons why the society is unwilling to use 
the R criterion without modification. For instance, in a particular situation 
society may not wish to identify marginal social sacrifice and marginal social 
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significance with quantities entering the calculations of individual firm managers. 
A resource use may involve either social sacrifice or social gain that does not 
affect the profits of the firm using the resources, leading to a disassociation 
between sacrifice and gain. " 
For instance annexation of adjoining areas into a city may be needed to 
associate tax payments with use of city streets so that all persons using the 
streets may help pay for them. Or, discharge of untreated chemical wastes 
into streams may be prohibited, particularly if the cost of treatment is· slight 
in relation to the damage done by untreated wastes. Similarly, prizes may be 
given to encourage firms to design plants that will be an aesthetic asset to the 
community. In each c&se, restrictions to reduce the disassociations in 
addition to the R criterion may be considered. 
In other cases, price discrimination (charging two or more prices for 
different units of a given product) will make it difficult to judge resource 
allocation. When price discrimination is possible investigation must be more 
detailed than that associated with a simple resource allocation criterion. The 
lack of a unique set of prices (one for each product) makes it difficult to e 
evaluate the associated resource allocation. 
Resource Allocation and Markets for Intermediate Goods 
We have been concerned largely with interpreting the R criterion. Let 
us now consider how the value of R in the market for a consumer good is affected 
by conditions of competition in the market for an agricultural good used in 
producing the consumer good. If we do not have perfect competition on both 
sides of the market for the agricultural product, will this market affect adversely 
the market for the consumer good? 
Let XA be the quantity of an agricultural good used in the production of a 
consumer good A. We have seen that perfect competition on both sides of the 
XA market would not create any tendency for R to deviate from 1 in the A 
market. Since the XA market affects the A market only through the quantity 
XA, we want to know whether XA under specified conditions will be the same as 
it would be if there were perfect competition on both sides of the XA market. 
If there are two or more sellers of XA, we assume they are identical. We 
want to show a supply curve for a group of sellers (a curve showing for each 
given price the total quantity that will be offered by the sellers as a group). At 
any price, the quantity offered by n sellers will be n times the quantity shown 
on an individual marginal cost of XA_ curve, since each marginal cost curve will 
coincide with a seller's individual supply curve. Instead of drawing a new 
diagram to show the supply curve of the groop, we assume that an n:1 horizontal 
scale factor is used; therefore, a horizontal distance representing one unit of 
XA with reference to an individual seller represents n units of XA with reference 
to the group of n sellers. 
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We make an analogous assumption about the demand side of the XA market. 
In fig. 8, we show quantities of XA horizontally and price of XA vertically. 
If there is perfect competition in both buying and selling XA, the marginal 
value product of XA curve is a demand curve (a curve showing for each price of 
XA the quantity that will be bought) and the marginal cost of XA curve is a 
supply curve. The output of XA will be OB, and the price BC. Thus R is 1, as 
suggested earlier. 
If there is monopoly in selling XA and perfect competition in buying it 1 
its marginal value product curve becomes a demand curve for X . There is a 
corresponding curve showing marginal revenue from the sale ofAxA. The seller 
can maximize his profit by equating the marginal revenue of XA to the marginal 
cost of XA 1 at the output 6>G with the price GK. In comparison with the output 
OB under perfect competition, monopoly restricts the output of XA and so 
indirectly restricts the output of consumer good A. 
If there is monoposny in buying XA and perfect competition in selling XA, 
its marginal cost curve becomes a supply curve; the monopsonist can set the 
price. The marginal outlay on XA curve shows the rate at which his total outlay 
increases as his use of XA increases. To maximize his :·profit, he must equate 
the marginal value product of XA to the marginal outlay on XA, buying OE at the 
price EJ. This output is smaller than it would be with perfect competition on 
both sides of the XA market, so monopsony in the XA rryarket tends to restrict 
output of A· and thus to make R greater than 1 in the A:.rnarket. 
Incidentally, R is 1 in the XA market, but we are concerned with the XA 
market only as it affects the A market. 
If there is monopoly on each side of the XA market (bilateral monopoly) 
there is neither a demand curve nor a supply curve for XA. (A demand curve is 
based on the assumption that price is announced to the buyer, and a supply 
curve on the assumption that price in announced to the seller.) Buyer and 
seller will bargain about both price and quantity. 
Ignore the buyer's costs other than his expenditure on XA, and the seller's 
costs other than those shown in the cost of XA curve. The sum of profits of 
buyer and seller is shown by the area between the marginal value product of 
XA curve, and the marginal cost of XA curve enclosed by a vertical line drawn 
from the quantity of XA sold. For instance, let'OG be the quantity of XA. 
If the price is OT, OSKG is the buyer's total revenue, QTKG his total costs, 
and TSK his profit. OTKG is the seller's total revenue, OLHG his total cost, 
and LTKH his profit. The sum of the bargainers' profits is LSKH. 
Given the quantity OG to be sold, LSKH is the sum of the bargainers' 
profits whatever the price at which the OG units may be sold. OSKG is the 
buyer's total revenue 1 and OLHG the seller's total cost. Money paid by the 
buyer to the seller cannot affect the sum of their profits. The profits will equal 
the buyer's revenue minus the seller's cost. 
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The bargainers can maximize the sum of their profits by making the XA 
quantity OB, giving a profit of LSC 0 They can then bargain about the price of 
XA to determine the division of LSC. between them. 
Since OB is the perfectly competitive output of XA, bilateral monopolists 
maximizing the sum of their profits affect the A market exactly as it would be 
affected if there were perfect competition on both sides of the XA market. 
This result may seem strange, but bilateral monopolists can determine 
output without determining price at the same time. A monopolist or monopsonist 
must determine price and output simultaneously. 
Creation of bilateral monopoly may depend on horizontal combination among 
sellers -- either merger or concerted action among firms in the same production 
stage. There also may be horizontal combination among buyers. If there have 
been horizontal mergers followed by bilateral monopoly operations, vertical 
combination (merger of firms in successive stages of production) may follow. 
Instead of bargaining repetitively about prices and quantities of goods 1 
negotiators may find it more efficient to bargain only once 1 for the rate of ex-
change of shares of stock in their corporations. 
Once vertical integration has taken place 1 there is no reason for events 
in tpe XA · marketfo influence the A market unfavorably. 
Bilateral monopoly in the XA market, like vertical integration doing away 
with the XA market, is compatible with optimal allocation of resources among 
processes leading to consumer goods. 
Conclusions 
Finally 1 we should note that society has objectives in addition to the 
"quality of resource allocation" objective. For instance 1 it is like'ly to be 
concerned with the quality of income distribution. Any social action affecting 
resource allocation probably will affect also income distribution. If the 
society wants to increase the ratio of the income of sellers in a given market 
to the income of buyers in the same market, it may maintain laws that tend to 
create monopoly, even if laws that would create perfect competition or bilateral 
monopoly would be preferable on the basis of the society's criterion for resource 
allocation. 
When we deal with resource allocation, we avoid considering dis crimina~ 
tion among persons. When we deal with income distribution 1 we may be 
particularly interested in bringing about a specified kind of discrimination among 
persons o Probably the institutional arrangement selected by the society will 
make neither the exact set of interpersonal discriminations that the society wants 
nor create a resource allocation entirely in accordance with the desires of the 
consumers and workers, but represent some compromise between these two 
conflicting objectives. 
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GLOSSARY 
Monopoly: a market in which there is only g. single seller of a product 
Monopsony: a market in which there is only a single buyer of a product 
Horizontal combination: a collective monopoly created by agreement among all 
sellers or buyers of a product 
Oligopoly: a market in which there are only a few sellers 1 and the demand for the 
output of each firm depends on the decisions of the other sellers 
Elasticity of demand: a numerical coefficient which shows the percentage change in 
the quantity of a product consumers will purchase with a percentage change in 
the price of the product; a measure of demand responsiveness to price changes 
Elasticity of supply: a numerical coefficient which shows the percentage change in 
quantity producers will supply with a percentage change in the price of the 
product; a measure of supply responsiveness to price changes 
Demand schedule (curve): a schedule showing the various quantities of a product 
consumers will buy at alternative prices assuming that consumers' prefer-
ences 1 incomes 1 and the prices of other products do not change 
Supply schedule (curve): a schedule showing the various quantities of a product 
firms will offer at alternative prices 
Marginal revenue: the change in total revenue which occurs as a result of a one 
unit change in the quantity sold; the slope of the total revenue curve 
Marginal cost: the change in total cost associated with a one unit change in the 
rate of output by a firm; the slope of the total cost curve 
Marginal outlay: the cost associated with the purchase of an additional unit of a 
product or an input 
Marginal value product: the value of the change in output resulting from the use of 
one additional unit of a given input 
Bilateral monopoly: a market situation in which a monopolist sells to a monopsonist 
(single seller faces a single buyer) 
Vertical integration: the extension by a firm at one level of management control 
forward or backward to other levels of the production-marketing sequence 
for a commodity 
Perfect competition: an "ideal" market situation in which there are a large number 
of firms selling a homogeneous product 
